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Public Health in the Opioid Litigation
Dr. Daniel G. Aaron*
Today, the opioid crisis is playing out in the nation’s courts. Litigants
have taken a microscope to defendant opioid companies whose misconduct
ignited and exacerbated the opioid crisis. As the litigation continues, one
could imagine numerous ways its resolution could contribute to the end of a
multi-decade overdose crisis and prevent future ones. Options include
holding defendant companies accountable, releasing previously secret
information for research on root causes of the epidemic, and prohibiting
future misconduct through injunctive relief. Unfortunately, to date, the
litigation has not been so capacious. Rather, the participants—judge
included—have been preoccupied with rapid monetary settlement. Though
understandable, attempts to obtain rapid monetary relief take a narrow view
of public health. That is, we help the most readily identifiable victims, with
less regard for structural factors that led to the crisis in the first place. This
avoidance of structural change is at odds with public health and fails to meet
this moment, defined by the most urgent public health crisis in modern
history: the COVID-19 pandemic.
To explain why the litigation participants have pursued rapid monetary
settlement, this paper uses the lens of agency. As will be shown, the opioid
litigation is an agent of public health. That is, given the litigation’s tight
connections with public health, it must represent the broad health of the
populace. This paper then identifies numerous incentive problems that
create misalignment with public health. Viewed in this light, the pursuit of
rapid monetary settlement becomes more understandable—though not
justifiable. This paper offers solutions for curing these agency problems and
ensuring that public health is properly represented in future public health
litigation.
If there is any time to be capacious as to the scope of public health, that
time is now. While corporate misconduct plays a significant role in the
spread of COVID-19, it is even more relevant to the opioid crisis, a public
health emergency initiated and exacerbated by defendants in the litigation.
Therefore, relief must consider not only how to help opioid victims, but how
to release as much information as possible about root causes and to
discourage the misconduct that helped precipitate the epidemic. In other
words, the court can and must take a deeper look at broader relief that
benefits more people on a longer time scale. Expanding the scope of public
11
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health in the opioid litigation could yield more robust public health benefits
for current and future generations. It could also create lasting precedent by
expressing the norm that sales revenue and economic growth must not come
at the expense of human life. Such a norm, operationalized through law,
could offer significantly more enduring value than a one-shot bolus of
money.
This paper, together with its companion,1 offers a new way to conceive of
public health litigation and its benefits. This conception is grounded in a
broad definition of public health. It is too soon to forsake public health for
feasibility or realism; in fact, this paper suggests practical ways the judge
and litigants can improve the impact of the opioid litigation within civil
procedure’s bounds.
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INTRODUCTION
Litigation seems like a strange place to address a public health crisis. With
federal courts insisting they need to cabin their own authority,2 it may feel
odd they are now overseeing claims against opioid companies about a
twenty-year wave of addiction that has cost untold lives and shaken the
country’s health and medical infrastructure to its core—what some scholars
have called the “juggernaut” of public health emergencies.3
And yet it is hard to think of anything invoking public health more clearly
than litigation touching a historic health epidemic, in which nearly every
city, county, and state in the country is participating. References to public
health pepper court documents.4 Judge Daniel Aaron Polster has openly
expressed his dismay that we have allowed such a massive loss of life to take
place—“we’re losing more than 50,000 of our citizens every year.”5 He has
stated openly that his “objective is to do something meaningful to abate this

2. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (citing Ariz. State
Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015)) (ruling partisan
gerrymandering is beyond the scope of judicial review); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 341 (2006) (asserting that a confined judicial role is fundamental to separation of powers).
3. James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Exploring Legal and Policy Responses to Opioids: America’s
Worst Public Health Emergency, 70 S.C. L. REV. 481, 483 (2019).
4. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Approve Co-Leads, Co-Liaisons & Executive
Comm. at 6, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2018), ECF
No. 34 (“We recognize that this is uniquely demanding litigation, with the health and safety of
hundreds of thousands of Americans, and the governmental and private entities dedicated to their
care, at stake in a crisis that advances daily.”); Ord. Regarding ARCOS Data at 16, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 233 (noting opioid
crisis affects “health and safety of the entire country”); Op. & Ord. at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription
Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio July 26, 2018), ECF No. 800 (“public health crisis”);
Fifth Amended Complaint at 16, City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 1:14-cv-4361 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2020), ECF No. 715 (“public health epidemic”); see
generally Complaint, Pell City v. Purdue Pharma, Case No. 4:20-cv-00203 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 14,
2020), ECF No. 1 (invoking public health twenty-seven times).
5. Transcript of Proc. at 4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio
Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 58.
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crisis.”6 These admissions of the relevance of public health to Article III
litigation are remarkable. One can understand, then, why Judge Polster might
promote early settlement and the associated expedited relief to opioid
victims.7 The other litigation participants have, for the most part, supported
the prospect of early settlement.8
However, the grand irony is that efforts to quickly and globally settle
opioid claims may be inconsistent with public health and, indeed, may be
replicating an individualized model of health, with little attention to the
superseding structures and derivative problems that brought us here.9 Public
health, at its core, “focuses on health at a population, rather than individual,
level.”10 One can imagine a spate of public health outcomes from the opioid
litigation, including the release of documents for research on the root causes
of the crisis, injunctive relief blocking future opioid company misconduct,
and the prospect of holding defendants accountable for conduct that most
scholars agree was foundational to the crisis.11 Can rapid monetary
settlement achieve the same goals?12 The dissonance becomes even larger as

6. Id.
7. See id. at 4–5 (stating that “[w]e’ve just got to plow through this” and recognizing that people
are not interested in “finger-pointing” but rather in solutions to the opioid crisis).
8. See infra Section IV.A. (discussing the support for quick monetary settlements).
9. For discussion of this dichotomy, see generally Lindsay F. Wiley & Samuel R. Bagenstos,
How the Law Harms Public Health, DEMOCRACY (June 16, 2020, 4:59 PM),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/how-the-law-harms-public-health/
[https://perma.cc/U5MJ-Y6NT] (explaining that laws controlling the spread of infectious disease
result in restrictions that center on individual responsibility); Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New
Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 212–14 (2012) (describing the expanding scope of
public health and critiques of public-health law, including personal responsibility in public health).
10. Wiley, supra note 9, at 214.
11. See, e.g., Andrew Kolodny et al., The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public
Health Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 18 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 562–63 (2015)
(explaining the role that pharmaceutical companies and other stakeholders played in the opioid
crisis, such as pushing to overcome physicians’ reluctance to prescribe opioids for pain); Rebecca
L. Haffajee & Michael R. Abrams, Settling the Score: Maximizing the Public Health Impact of
Opioid Litigation, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 701, 735 (2019) (stating that settlement funds and requirements
to change behavior are two critical steps toward holding opioid manufacturers, distributors, and
pharmacies accountable for their roles in the opioid crisis); Art Van Zee, The Promotion and
Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
221, 225 (2009) (suggesting strategies for reducing the over- and mis-prescribing of opioids,
including limiting marketing of such controlled substances, interactions between physicians and
pharmaceutical sales representatives, and influence of pharmaceutical companies in medical
education); Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical
Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 466–72 (2017) (describing Purdue Pharma’s contributing
role in the opioid crisis, including applying for and receiving patent for extended-release
oxycodone, providing the company with exclusive marketing and promotion capabilities); see also
infra Section I.A. (reviewing opioid manufacturers’ trial verdicts, criminal settlements, and
criminal sentences).
12. For discussion of how quick monetary settlements disserve larger public health goals, see
infra Section IV.B.
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one considers that many litigation participants have expressly claimed to
bear the mantle of public health. The very scope of public health, and its
inclusion of people beyond those immediately identifiable, is at stake.
Should the litigation serve only a limited population of opioid victims with
modest settlement funds, then public health will be public in name only. A
true public-health approach would aim to protect the public from future mass
losses of life by illuminating root causes and undoing perverse incentive
structures.
The settlement approach favored by the players in the opioid litigation has
implications far beyond opioids. Collectively, the United States is
experiencing a public-health “moment” due to the novel coronavirus;
unprecedented numbers of people are reckoning with the importance of
public health.13 And yet, too often, COVID-19 debates have stressed
monetary relief and individual action, such as mask-wearing and social
distancing, instead of larger legal structures and public health mechanisms,
such as liability for corporations that have exacerbated the pandemic. In one
well-known case, a South Dakota meatpacking plant that neither practiced
social distancing among employees nor exercised other protective controls
experienced an outbreak of 929 cases, or 25.6 percent of the plant’s
workforce.14 A worker and a nonprofit sued, arguing workers and
community members “may die—all because Smithfield refused to change its
practices in the face of this pandemic.”15 Instead of incentivizing
corporations to protect their workers and avoid outbreaks, Congress has
heavily considered financial relief packages with coronavirus liability
protections for employers.16 These packages bear significant similarity to the

13. See infra Section II.B. (discussing impact COVID-19 has had on attention to public-health
concerns). According to a 2021 report, 71 percent of adults favor substantial increases in publichealth funding, and 72 percent believe public-health agencies play important roles in the nation’s
health. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. & HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, THE
PUBLIC’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM 2 (2021).
14. Jonathan Steinberg et al., COVID-19 Outbreak Among Employees at a Meat Processing
Facility—South Dakota, March–April 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1015,
1015–16 (2020).
15. Sebastian Martinez Valdivia & Dan Margolies, Workers Sue Smithfield Foods, Allege
Conditions Put Them at Risk for COVID-19, NPR (Apr. 24, 2020, 4:29 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/04/24/844644200/workers-sue-smithfield-foods-allege-conditions-putthem-at-risk-for-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/LWD6-Z2EB].
16. See Erica Werner & Tom Hamburger, White House and Congress Clash over Liability
Protections for Businesses as Firms Cautiously Weigh Virus Reopening Plans, WASH. POST (May
3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/05/03/congress-coronavirus-legalliability [https://perma.cc/X2DN-GFTB] (discussing debate within Congress during early stages of
the coronavirus pandemic on whether to provide businesses with liability protections against
employees contracting the virus). As of June 2021, about thirty states enacted broad COVID-19
liability protections for businesses. See Chris Marr, Covid-19 Shield Laws Proliferate Even As
Liability Suits Do Not, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 8, 2021, 5:31 AM),
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settlement of opioid claims for a modest sum of money. Both government
responses suggest that legal incentives can be purchased and neutralized, and
that lawmakers fail to realize the full potential of tort law to redress publichealth harms. This paper and its companion17 lay out a contrasting vision of
tort law—one that maximizes public health consistent with the litigation’s
agency obligations. How we resolve the opioid litigation will forge precedent
for how we treat future public-health emergencies appearing on the doorstep
of Article III courts. It also could potentially prevent a future public-health
emergency, as did asbestos litigation.18
Part I will introduce the opioid crisis and related litigation. Part II will
discuss the implicit battle over the scope of public health. Part III will argue
that the opioid litigation is inextricably linked to broad public health. That
is, the litigation is public health’s agent. Part IV will examine the agency
problems. Prior scholarship has emphasized the disconnect between
plaintiffs in mass litigation and their attorneys, the judges, and the system
more generally—that is, agency problems that hurt plaintiffs.19 However,

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/covid-19-shield-laws-proliferate-evenas-liability-suits-do-not.
17. Aaron, supra note 0.
18. See id. at 29–30 (describing the impact of asbestos litigation in providing accountability).
19. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING
IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 16 (2019) [hereinafter BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS] (discussing the
attorney-client “agency problem” that exists in class-action lawsuits because plaintiffs cannot
watch over their attorney and ensure their best interest is represented as they could if individually
represented); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV.
67, 73–74 (2017) [hereinafter Burch, MDL Monopolies] (examining how principles of the market
and agency factor into litigation); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 73–75 (2015) (describing three practices by judges that impact plaintiffs:
appointing lead lawyers, implementing non-uniform ways of compensating lead lawyers, and
presiding over settlements without a legal basis); Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 702 (2013) (describing issues raised in class-action lawsuits, including
the faithfulness of the agent, issues related to the collective nature of one entity, and the need for
individual autonomy despite the collective entity); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12, (1991) (“Yet attorneys do not always fulfill
this responsibility, because their interests are rarely perfectly aligned with those of the client.”);
Abbe R. Gluck et al., Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a National
Health Crisis, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 351, 358–59 (2018) (arguing that elected officials and
attorneys might be incentivized to quickly settle cases rather than remedy the larger health crisis);
John C. Coffee Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 628
(1987) (describing conflicts of interest between attorneys and clients as an “‘agency cost’
problem”); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, Sweetheart and Blackmail Settlements in Class
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377–78, 1389–92 (2000)
(describing “sweetheart” and “blackmail” settlements, which are deals that provide class members
with either too little or too much); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action
Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104
(2006) (describing lawyers as “independent entrepreneurs driven by the desire to maximize their
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this paper articulates a higher-level agency problem, namely the
representation of public health by the litigation. Part V will offer solutions.
The companion article will offer a more detailed account of how to maximize
public health in the litigation.20
I. BACKGROUND ON THE OPIOID CRISIS21 AND RELATED LITIGATION
Since the current opioid crisis began in the 1990s,22 it has led to more than
500,000 American deaths.23 Recognizing that the crisis was largely caused
by aggressive and often illegal corporate misconduct, plaintiffs have sued
opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies in federal and state courts
across the country.
A. The Opioid Crisis
The opioid crisis arguably began in 1996 with the commercial
introduction of controlled-release oxycodone, or OxyContin.24 Oxycodone
had been invented in 1916 and was used in clinical practice in 1917, but it
was not until 1996 that Purdue Pharmaceuticals (Purdue) combined

gain” and further articulating the conventional viewpoint that class-action decisions may be
determined by lawyers’ economic interests, not the interests of the class).
20. Aaron, supra note 1.
21. For simplicity, this paper will use the term “the opioid crisis” even though there have been
prior opioid crises. See Kolodny et al., supra note 11, at 561–62 (discussing previous opioid crises
that began as early as the second half of the nineteenth century, became an increasing problem that
reached its peak in the 1890s, continued into the twentieth century, and largely impacted minority
populations by the 1960s); see also DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF
OPIOID ADDICTION IN AMERICA 2 (Harv. Univ. Press enl. ed., 2001) (“[O]piate addiction increased
throughout the nineteenth century, peaked in the 1890s, and thereafter began a sustained decline.”).
22. Hodge et al., supra note 3, at 485.
23. Recent research has indicated that national data surveillance has underestimated the death
toll of the opioid crisis. See Olga Khazan, The Opioid Epidemic Might Be Much Worse Than We
Thought, ATL. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/02/more-peoplehave-died-opioids-us-thought/607165 [https://perma.cc/7MLT-BZHU]. Between 1999 and 2016,
there were about 453,300 opioid deaths in the U.S. Id. In 2020, the U.S. suffered 69,710 deaths
from opioids. Bill Chappell, Drug Overdoses Killed a Record Number of Americans in 2020,
Jumping
by
Nearly
30%,
NPR
(July
14,
2021,
6:53
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/07/14/1016029270/drug-overdoses-killed-a-record-number-ofamericans-in-2020-jumping-by-nearly-30 [https://perma.cc/A8ZF-LNQU]. Therefore, when one
adds in 2017–19 and 2021, a more likely figure for the death toll of the opioid crisis is 700,000.
24. See Hodge et al., supra note 3, at 486 (memorializing 1996 as the year Purdue Pharma
released its opioid-based pain reliever OxyContin); Theodore J. Cicero & Matthew S. Ellis, The
Prescription Opioid Epidemic: A Review of Qualitative Studies on the Progression from Initial Use
to Abuse, 19 DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 259, 263 (2017) (explaining that the introduction
of OxyContin was a major factor in growing opioid abuse because crushing or dissolving pills
defeated the purpose of the slow-release capsule, originally designed to dissuade abuse, and
provided an available source of the drug); Van Zee, supra note 11, at 221 (stating that the 1996,
highly marketed, release of OxyContin resulted in OxyContin becoming the leading drug of abuse
by 2004).
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oxycodone with the controlled-release system Contin.25 A controlled-release
drug allows for a slower trickle of drug into the bloodstream. Thus,
OxyContin was born. With new technology in hand, Purdue pushed the idea
that the controlled release provided smoother, more consistent pain relief for
longer periods of time with less risk of addiction.26 The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office originally denied Purdue’s patent application because the
combination of any pain reliever with Contin was too obvious.27 However,
Purdue eventually won its appeal to the Federal Circuit, in part because it
marshalled fraudulent evidence of the drug’s efficacy and novelty.28 With a
broad period of market exclusivity,29 Purdue aggressively marketed
OxyContin to physicians, and simultaneously promoted concepts that would
increase opioid prescribing more generally.30 For example, Purdue funded
the American Pain Society, whose “Pain is the fifth vital sign” campaign
aimed to convince providers that pain must be treated as aggressively as
perturbations in basic vital signs like blood pressure and breathing rate.31 By
2000, there were widespread reports of OxyContin misuse, and the drug
quickly became the most widely misused opioid.32 However, opioid

25. Sarpatwari et al., supra note 11, at 468. Prior to OxyContin’s release, Purdue sold the opioid
MS Contin, a combination of Contin with morphine sulphate. Id. at 469.
26. See Harriet Ryan et al., ‘You Want a Description of Hell?’ OxyContin’s 12-Hour Problem,
L.A.
TIMES
(May
5,
2016),
https://www.latimes.com/projects/oxycontin-part1
[https://perma.cc/7DRU-NG8K] (displaying a press release from Purdue Pharma advertising
“smooth and sustained pain control all day”).
27. Sarpatwari et al., supra note 11, at 469–70 (explaining that to obtain a patent, the material
must be novel, useful, and non-obvious, where obviousness is determined “from the perspective of
a person possessing ordinary skill in the relevant field”).
28. See id. at 470. (“Purdue’s claim that extended-release oxycodone provided pain relief for
90 percent of patients within [a] narrower dosage range was false, and it would later emerge that
Purdue was aware of this falsehood.”); see also Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 438 F.3d
1123, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In light of Purdue’s consistent representations of the four-fold dosage
range for controlled release oxycodone as a ‘surprising discovery’ and the context in which that
statement was repeatedly made, we cannot say the trial court’s finding that Purdue failed to disclose
material information was clearly erroneous.”).
29. Sarpatwari et al., supra note 11, at 471.
30. See Van Zee, supra note 11, at 221 (stating that Purdue led an aggressive campaign,
focusing on the use of OxyContin to promote the use of opioids).
31. See Kolodny et al., supra note 11, at 562 (indicating Purdue Pharma provided financial
grants to over 20,000 educational programs focused on pain, including the American Pain Society
and its “Pain is the Fifth Vital Sign” campaign); Cicero & Ellis, supra note 24, at 262–63
(discussing the “fifth vital sign” campaign and the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organization’s release of a report concluding doctors were not properly managing
patients’ pain due to an “irrational fear of addiction,” which led to doctors prescribing narcotics);
Sarpatwari et al., supra note 11, at 465–66 (explaining that the campaign led many experts to
downplay the opioids’ addictiveness and encouraged opioid use for chronic pain).
32. See Theodore J. Cicero et al., Trends in Abuse of OxyContin® and Other Opioid Analgesics
in the United States: 2002–2004, 6 J. PAIN 662, 662, 670 (2005) (explaining that hydrocodone
products were previously the most abused analgesic but that by 2005 OxyContin ranked the same
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company marketing was a tide that lifted all boats:
Prior to the introduction of OxyContin, many physicians were
reluctant to prescribe OPRs [opioid pain relievers] on a long-term
basis for common chronic conditions because of their concerns
about addiction, tolerance, and physiological dependence. To
overcome what they claimed to be “opiophobia,” physicianspokespersons for opioid manufacturers published papers and gave
lectures in which they claimed that the medical community had been
confusing addiction with “physical dependence.” They described
addiction as rare and completely distinct from so-called “physical
dependence,” which was said to be “clinically unimportant.” They
cited studies with serious methodological flaws to highlight the
claim that the risk of addiction was less than 1%.33
Opioid companies were enormously successful in their marketing and
played a critical role in the rise in opioid prescriptions that ignited the opioid
epidemic.34
It is worth highlighting some of the misconduct that occurred around this
time, as various court proceedings revealed. Purdue is likely the most
infamous wrongdoer. In 2007, amidst criminal and civil charges by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) asserting that Purdue engaged in misleading
marketing by downplaying OxyContin’s risks, Purdue Pharmaceuticals and
three executives settled for $634.5 million.35 Between 2017 and 2019, the
DOJ and several U.S. Attorneys’ offices commenced fresh investigations of
Purdue on the grounds that Purdue failed to properly monitor opioid sales
and failed to report doctors illegally prescribing its opioids.36
Insys Therapeutics admitted to bribing doctors to prescribe its opioid
product Subsys (fentanyl mouth spray).37 Insys’s founder, John Kapoor, was

as hydrocodone, or higher). Increases in prescription drug abuse were driven by OxyContin and
hydrocodone from 2000–02. Id. at 671.
33. Kolodny et al., supra note 11, at 562.
34. Id. at 560–61 (discussing significant rise in hydrocodone and oxycodone consumption from
1999–2011 and noting that use of opioid pain relievers also led to an increase in heroin use); Van
Zee, supra note 11, at 223–24 (explaining that Purdue Pharma’s marketing campaign was
successful in downplaying the addictive nature of opioids, which increased rates of opioid abuse
and addiction, leading to more illicit drug abuse of prescription opioids than of cocaine and heroin);
Expert Rep. of Professor Meredith Rosenthal at 10, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No.
2804 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2019), ECF No. 1899-20.
35. See Sara Randazzo, Purdue Pharma in Talks with Justice Department to Resolve Criminal,
Civil Probes, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/purdue-pharmain-talks-with-justice-department-to-resolve-criminal-civil-probes11567792243?mod=rsswn&amp;page=1&amp;pos=1 [https://perma.cc/KE58-J6MQ] (explaining
that three of Purdue Pharma’s executives pled guilty to producing misleading information about
OxyContin, including information about the risk of addiction).
36. Id.
37. Gabrielle Emanuel, Opioid-Maker Insys Admits to Bribing Doctors, Agrees to Pay $225
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sentenced to sixty-six months in prison.38 In 2008, McKesson Corp. settled
for $13 million with the DOJ for failing to report, as required by the
Controlled Substances Act,39 suspiciously high sales of prescription
opioids.40 In 2017, McKesson Corp. settled again with the DOJ for $150
million after the company “did not fully implement or adhere to its own
program.”41 Practice Fusion, Inc., an electronic health records developer,
settled with the DOJ for $145 million on claims it received kickbacks from
Purdue in exchange for creating software alerts that nudged doctors to
prescribe more opioids.42 In 2019, Oklahoma State Judge Thad Balkman
concluded, after a thirty-three-day trial, that Johnson & Johnson engaged in
“false, misleading, and dangerous marketing campaigns” that “caused
exponentially increasing rates of addiction, overdose deaths, and Neonatal
Abstinence Syndrome [addiction in newborns].”43 Judge Balkman also
determined that Johnson & Johnson sought to neutralize public health

Million
Settlement,
NPR
(June
5,
2019,
10:12
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/05/730173846/opioid-maker-insys-admits-to-bribing-doctorsagrees-to-pay-225-million-settlement [https://perma.cc/T98Q-M26Q] (“[T]he drugmaker admitted
orchestrating a nationwide scheme in which it set up a sham ‘speaker program.’ Participating
doctors were not paid to give speeches, but to write prescriptions of Insys Therapeutics’ fentanylbased medication, Subsys.”).
38. Tim McLaughlin, Insys Founder Kapoor Sentenced to 66 Months in Prison for Opioid
Scheme, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2020, 6:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insysopioids/insys-founder-kapoor-sentenced-to-66-months-in-prison-for-opioid-schemeidUSKBN1ZM1QB [https://perma.cc/TS28-FU87] (explaining that Kapoor’s sentence was much
longer than those of other pharmaceutical representatives charged with contribution to the opioid
crisis but that other members of the company were also convicted as a part of the conspiracy).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 832(a)(3).
40. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., McKesson Corporation Agrees to Pay More than $13
Million to Settle Claims That It Failed to Report Suspicious Sales of Prescription
Medications (May 2, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/May/08-opa-374.html
[https://perma.cc/LW3Q-K76V] (explaining McKesson had violated the Controlled Substances
Act by failing to report suspicious sales of controlled substances and suspicious orders received
from other pharmacies, leading to settlement of $13,250,000 with the Department of Justice).
41. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., McKesson Agrees to Pay Record $150 Million
Settlement for Failure to Report Suspicious Orders of Pharmaceutical Drugs (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mckesson-agrees-pay-record-150-million-settlement-failurereport-suspicious-orders [https://perma.cc/XRV9-EGPB].
42. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Electronic Health Records Vendor to Pay $145 Million
to
Resolve
Criminal
and
Civil
Investigations
(Jan.
27,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/electronic-health-records-vendor-pay-145-million-resolvecriminal-and-civil-investigations-0 [https://perma.cc/5P35-JNBH] (explaining the settlement
amount and Practice Fusion’s admission to receiving kickbacks); Mike Spector & Tom Hals,
Exclusive: OxyContin Maker Purdue Is ‘Pharma Co X’ in U.S. Opioid Kickback Probe–Sources,
REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2020, 3:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-purdue-pharmainvestigation-opioids-e/exclusive-oxycontin-maker-purdue-is-pharma-co-x-in-us-opioidkickback-probe-sources-idUSKBN1ZR2RY [https://perma.cc/U3Q2-HPWB] (discussing the
settlement and the illegal kickbacks).
43. State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 Okla. Dist. LEXIS 3486,
at *2, *37–38 (Okla. Dist. Aug. 26, 2019).
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regulations of opioids using an anti-regulatory “swat team.”44 As a result, he
delivered a $572 million judgment against Johnson & Johnson.45 This, and
other misconduct,46 was essential to the establishment of the opioid
epidemic.
Between 1999 and 2010, opioid sales, addiction, treatment admissions,
and deaths climbed in proportion.47 Drug overdose deaths, largely opioidrelated, increased from 16,849 in 1999 to 70,237 in 2017, a 417 percent
increase.48 The total quantity of opioids sold in the United States (in
morphine milligram equivalents) peaked in 2010, then began to decrease
gradually.49
In 2010, the nature of the epidemic somewhat shifted when Purdue
introduced an abuse-deterrent version of OxyContin that, when crushed,
turned into a gummy substance rather than a powder that could be snorted or
injected.50 While the reformulation appeared to reduce OxyContin-related
poisonings and mortality, heroin became a substitute,51 leading to a rapid

44. Id. at *24.
45. Id. at *44, *61; see also Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in
Landmark
Opioid
Trial,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
26,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/oklahoma-opioids-johnson-and-johnson.html
[https://perma.cc/AU4T-YP5Y] (discussing the judgement entered against Johnson & Johnson).
This sum was later reduced to $465 million due to a math error. Lenny Bernstein, Oklahoma Judge
Lowers Johnson & Johnson Payment in Opioid Verdict, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/oklahoma-judge-lowers-johnson-and-johnson-paymentin-opioid-verdict/2019/11/15/e5b8fce2-07d4-11ea-818c-fcc65139e8c2_story.html
[https://perma.cc/3MXL-DJKT].
46. Many of the allegations and resulting settlements have been catalogued in Rebecca L.
Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’ Liability for the Opioid Epidemic, 377 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2302–03 (2017).
47. See COMM. ON PAIN MGMT. & REGUL. STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS PRESCRIPTION OPIOID
ABUSE & NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID
EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION
OPIOID USE 51 (2017) (explaining that increase in opioid prescriptions that began in the late 1990s
was associated with increases in opioid-related deaths and substance use disorders); Overdose
Death Rates, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH: NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates
[https://perma.cc/3RXM-UAFJ] (outlining overdose death rates and opioid involvement).
48. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH: NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 47 (depicting the
national drug-involved overdose deaths between the years 1999 and 2017).
49. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA ANALYSIS OF LONG-TERM TRENDS IN
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID ANALGESIC PRODUCTS: QUANTITY, SALES, AND PRICE TRENDS 2 (2018),
https://www.fda.gov/media/111695/download [https://perma.cc/ZK46-YJJU] (noting the total
MMEs sold in aggregate opioid analgesic market between the years 1992 and 2016).
50. See William N. Evans et al., How the Reformulation of OxyContin Ignited the Heroin
Epidemic, 101 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 4 (2019) (explaining Purdue Pharma’s reformulation of
Oxycontin to prevent abuse).
51. Id. at 13 (“We provide quantitative evidence that the switch to the ADF OxyContin in
August 2010 led to the increase in the heroin death rate . . . .”); see Theodore J. Cicero & Matthew
S. Ellis, Abuse-Deterrent Formulations and the Prescription Opioid Abuse Epidemic in the United
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increase in heroin-related overdose deaths often called Wave Two of the
epidemic.52 Wave Three of the epidemic began in 2013 when fentanyl, a
highly potent synthetic opioid, began to be mixed with heroin, cocaine, and
other drugs.53 Synthetic opioids rapidly overtook other opioid subtypes as
the leading cause of opioid-related death,54 and government seizures of
fentanyl increased by nearly seven times between 2012 and 2014.55
Because overdose deaths involving prescription opioids have fallen, some
commentators have argued the prescription opioid component of the
epidemic has waned, and other types of opioids (i.e., illicit heroin, fentanyl,
and fentanyl analogs) now drive the epidemic.56 While this carries some
truth,57 death rates paint a partial story. Prescription opioids remain involved
in a sizeable fraction of opioid-related deaths, as shown in Figure 1.

States: Lessons Learned from OxyContin, 72 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 424, 426–27 (2015) (finding that
of those opioid users who switched opioids after the introduction of ADF OxyContin, 70 percent
switched to heroin, and most said heroin was the practical alternative). Interestingly, it is still not
clear if abuse-deterrent OxyContin has reduced misuse, as neither Purdue nor FDA has allowed
experts to view the data. See Matthew Perrone, Revamped OxyContin Was Supposed to Reduce
Abuse,
but
Has
It?,
AP
NEWS
(July
22,
2019),
https://apnews.com/938234589fae4c7187344b35dec8ddff
[https://perma.cc/2NWU-NPZU]
(citing mixed evidence on whether ADF OxyContin fights abuse). The new formulation also
extended Purdue’s patent from 2013 to 2030; therefore, the drug has been exclusive for twentyfour years so far—since 1996. Id.
52. Opioid Basics: Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/G8SSDUS8] (last updated Mar. 17, 2021) (explaining how the second wave of opioid overdose deaths
began in 2010 and involved rapid increases in heroin-related deaths).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Wilson R. Palacios, Our Response to Opioid Overdose Deaths Must Be As Nimble As Illicit
Opioid Markets, 2 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 2 (2019), doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.
2019.14634.
56. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, The Opioid Litigation Unicorn, 70 S.C. L. REV. 637, 652–54
(2019) (arguing that individuals suffering from opioid use disorder frequently move to illicit
synthetics, and people who find it difficult to obtain prescription drugs also move to street drugs
like fentanyl); Hodge et al., supra note 3, at 488–89 (explaining that the primary causes of opioidrelated deaths in 2010 and 2013 were illicit drugs and synthetic opioids).
57. See, e.g., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH: NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 47
(illustrating rising heroin overdose deaths between 1999 and 2019).
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Figure 1: Deaths in 2017 involving particular opioid subtypes.58
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Furthermore, prescription opioid misuse remains remarkably common and
far exceeds heroin use, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Opioid addiction and misuse among over age 12 during the
past year by self-report, 2017.59
Type of Opioid Use

Frequency Among Over Age 12 (2017)

Opioid use disorder

0.8 %

Opioid use disorder involving
prescription opioids

0.6 %

Prescription opioid misuse

4.1 %

Initiation of prescription opioid misuse

0.7 %

Heroin use

0.3 %

58. Id.
59. The data are drawn from CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ANNUAL
SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND OUTCOMES: UNITED STATES, 2019, at
16–19 (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2019-cdc-drug-surveillance-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6YPA-CZSV]. Data on the use of illicit fentanyl is difficult to obtain. Theodore
J. Cicero et al., Increases in Self-Reported Fentanyl Use Among a Population Entering Drug
Treatment: The Need for Systematic Surveillance of Illicitly Manufactured Opioids, 177 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 101, 101 (2017) (“Most large scale, national surveillance systems do not
track or inquire about illicitly manufactured synthetic opioids . . . . More importantly, there is no
practical way to distinguish between authentic and illicitly manufactured fentanyl, or whether illicit
fentanyl was used in counterfeit drugs sold as oxycodone, hydrocodone or alprazolam, without
chemically analyzing these products—a formidable and nearly impossible task on a nationally
representative level.”). Prescription fentanyl misuse from 2015 to 2016 was 0.1 percent. Ty S.
Schepis et al., The Epidemiology of Prescription Fentanyl Misuse in the United States, 96
ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 89, 91 (2019). However, illicit use is likely much more common.
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The 4.1 percent of the U.S. population (over twelve years old) who
misused a prescription opioid in the past year is equivalent to one in twentyfive Americans. Further, 0.7 percent of the over-twelve population initiated
prescription opioid misuse in the past year. Perhaps these numbers are not
surprising given that a full third of the U.S. population used a prescription
pain reliever in 2017,60 and addiction is proportional to exposure.61 In any
event, given that prescription opioids appear to be a strong locus of misuse,
claims that the opioid crisis has evolved beyond prescription opioids62 are
premature. Furthermore, research has found that opioid addiction generally
begins with prescription opioids.63
Because of the lives it has touched and extensive reporting by the press,

60. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 59, at 71.
61. See COURTWRIGHT supra note 21, at 6 (discussing how addiction is an “illness of
exposure”).
62. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 56, at 654 (“[T]hose who find it harder to acquire prescription
drugs will turn to street drugs such as fentanyl.”); Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Commentary, Opioid
Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 182–
83 (2018) (claiming that a second phase of the opioid crisis began when some prescription opioid
users transitioned to heroin as “a more potent and cheaper alternative”); cf. Michael J. Purcell,
Settling High: A Common Law Public Nuisance Response to the Opioid Epidemic, 52 COLUM. J.
L. & SOC. PROBS. 135, 142–43 (2018) (stating that the context of the opioid epidemic is “rapidly
changing” and the primary driver is no longer prescription abuse).
63. Cicero & Ellis, supra note 51, at 425–427 (describing users’ shift from prescription opioids
to heroin); Haffajee & Mello, supra note 46, at 2301 (“[T]he majority of persons with opioid
addiction started with prescribed painkillers.”); Laura B. Monico & Shannon Gwin Mitchell,
Patient Perspectives of Transitioning from Prescription Opioids to Heroin and the Role of Route
of Administration, 13 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, PREVENTION & POL’Y 1, 1 (2018)
(“Research during the last decade has established that individuals who abuse prescription opioids,
especially those with a physiological dependence, may shift to heroin use, particularly when they
already inhale or inject prescription opioids. Several of these studies have found remarkably high
likelihoods of heroin abuse after NMPO [non-medical use of prescription opioids] than without
NMPO, as high as nineteen times using data from 2011, to nearly forty times using data from 2013.”
(citations omitted)); Michael Fendrich & Jessica Becker, Prior Prescription Opioid Misuse in a
Cohort of Heroin Users in a Treatment Study, 8 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. REPS. 8, 8 (2018)
(“[R]esearch suggests that many heroin users started with opioid-related pain medications and then,
once they became dependent, transitioned to heroin, which is less expensive, more accessible, and
more potent.”); Kyle Simon et al., Abuse-Deterrent Formulations: Transitioning the
Pharmaceutical Market to Improve Public Health and Safety, 6 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN DRUG
SAFETY 67, 69 (2015) (“The prescription drug abuse epidemic is evolving. As a result of recent
successes in reducing the supply of opioids available for abuse, data suggest that many people who
abuse substances have switched from prescription drugs to illicit drugs, particularly heroin . . . .
This progression may have occurred because heroin is cheaper and easier to obtain in some
locations.” (citations omitted)); Christopher M. Jones, Heroin Use and Heroin Use Risk Behaviors
Among Nonmedical Users of Prescription Opioid Pain Relievers—United States, 2002–2004 and
2008–2010, 132 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 95, 95 (2013) (finding that from 2008–10,
people who frequently misused prescription opioids had more than four times the risk of injecting
heroin, and 82.6 percent of people who frequently misused prescription opioids and used heroin in
the past year reported initiating prescription opioid misuse first).
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the opioid crisis has received broad public recognition. As of 2018, 71
percent of Americans said that opioid addiction is a very serious problem,64
and 57 percent of Americans said pharmaceutical companies should be held
responsible for playing a role in the opioid epidemic.65
B. The Opioid Litigation
The initial wave of opioid litigation began in the early 2000s and mostly
involved Purdue Pharmaceuticals’ OxyContin.66 Claims were varied,
requested relatively low damages, and largely failed, arguably due to the
stigmatization of individual opioid victims.67 This wave had one major
success: a $634.5 million criminal settlement between Purdue and the DOJ.68
The current wave of litigation started in 2014, with increasing public
recognition of the opioid crisis.69 Almost every state has sued.70 Local
governments, fearful they might be left out as they were in the big tobacco
settlement, have joined the litigation.71 In addition, the defendants are
broader in the newer wave of opioid litigation, including manufacturers,
distributors, and pharmacies, as well as some physicians.72 Most plaintiffs
assert false and misleading marketing or failure to monitor or report
suspiciously high sales of opioids.73 Other claims are predicated on
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes, consumerprotection statutes, negligence, fraud, unjust enrichment, and public
nuisance.74

64. Jennifer De Pinto et al., Opioid Addiction in U.S.: 7 in 10 Say It’s a Very Serious Problem—
CBS News Poll, CBS NEWS (May 8, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/opioidaddiction-in-u-s-7-in-10-say-its-a-very-serious-problem-cbs-news-poll [https://perma.cc/3XDXJTH7].
65. Brian Mann, Majority of Americans Say Drug Companies Should Be Held Responsible for
Opioid
Crisis,
NPR
(Apr.
25,
2019,
5:12
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/25/716691823/majority-of-americans-say-drug-companies-shouldbe-held-responsible-for-opioid-c [https://perma.cc/53WQ-C5D2].
66. Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 353.
67. Id.
68. Randazzo, supra note 35. Funds went mostly to law enforcement and Medicaid programs,
rather than broad public health efforts. See Associated Press, Purdue Pharma, Execs to Pay $634.5
Million
Fine
in
OxyContin
Case,
CNBC
(Aug.
5,
2010,
4:38
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/id/18591525
[https://perma.cc/QQY9-WUTZ]
(noting
settlement
beneficiaries).
69. Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 354.
70. Joanna Walters, Purdue Pharma: Oxycontin Maker Faces Lawsuits from Nearly Every U.S.
State, GUARDIAN (June 4, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/jun/03/purdue-opioids-lawsuit-oxycontin-california-maine-hawaii
[https://perma.cc/D3X6-59HH].
71. Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 355.
72. Id. at 354.
73. Terry, supra note 56, at 639.
74. Haffajee & Abrams, supra note 11, at 707–08.
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In December 2017, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML)
consolidated sixty-four lawsuits into multidistrict litigation in the Northern
District of Ohio under Judge Daniel Aaron Polster.75 As claims continued to
be transferred, the number of centralized claims grew to more than 2,000.76
Judge Polster has admitted his overarching desire for global settlement.77 In
parallel with settlement efforts, he established a litigation track starting with
three bellwether trials brought by Ohio municipalities.78 These trials were
avoided by settlements valued at more than $300 million.79 The JPML has
since remanded several other lawsuits,80 although almost all remain
consolidated.
Notably, a new civil procedure device was invented in the opioid
multidistrict litigation (MDL), as oft happens in MDLs.81 In September
2019, after Professors Francis McGovern and William Rubenstein published
a draft article suggesting the innovation,82 Judge Polster agreed and certified

75. See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1380–82
(J.P.M.L. 2017) (ordering transfer of all matters listed in Schedule A to the Northern District of
Ohio); see also Eric Heisig, Cleveland Federal Judge to Hear Dozens of Lawsuits Filed Against
Big Pharma Nationwide, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/courtjustice/2017/12/cleveland_federal_judge_to_hea_1.html
[https://perma.cc/3HAT-VVH4]
(discussing the consolidation and transfer to U.S. District Judge Polster).
76. Colin Dwyer, Your Guide to the Massive (and Massively Complex) Opioid Litigation, NPR
(Oct. 15, 2019, 9:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/10/15/761537367/yourguide-to-the-massive-and-massively-complex-opioid-litigation [https://perma.cc/RU3E-6FHW].
77. See infra Section IV.A.1 (stating that Judge Polster urged settlement as other methods,
including trial, would accomplish nothing).
78. Case Mgmt. Ord. One at 6, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D.
Ohio Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 232 (outlining the “Case Tracks” for three of the consolidated cases).
79. Eric Heisig, Cuyahoga, Summit Counties Received Millions of Dollars Through Opioid
Litigation. See the Breakdown of the Settlements, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2019/10/cuyahoga-summit-counties-received-millionsof-dollars-through-opioid-litigation-see-the-breakdown.html
[https://perma.cc/6F5J-47TE]
(explaining the nine settlements between different drug companies and Cuyahoga and Summit
counties).
80. See Ken Miller, Two Federal Opioid Lawsuits Go Back to Oklahoma, California, AP NEWS
(Feb.
10,
2020),
https://apnews.com/32057372facdaf8446664182d2d4bda3
[https://perma.cc/ZC4Q-ULX6] (noting remand of cases back to California and Oklahoma); Jeff
Jenkins, Trial Date Set in Cabell-Huntington Opioid Trial; Parties Disagree on Discovery Issues,
METRONEWS (Mar. 5, 2020, 3:30 PM), http://wvmetronews.com/2020/03/05/trial-date-set-incabell-huntington-opioid-trial-parties-disagree-on-discovery-issues
[https://perma.cc/85WFXC3H] (noting developments in West Virginia lawsuit).
81. Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in
the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. 1669, 1671 (2017) (describing
the unorthodoxy of multidistrict litigation).
82. Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A Cooperative
Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders (June 20, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403834
[https://perma.cc/7V9X-F2HT].
The Texas Law Review later published the article. Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein,
The Negotiation Class: A Cooperative Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders,
99 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2020).
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a “class action” strictly for settlement purposes: a Rule 23(b)(3)83
“Negotiation Class” encompassing all cities and counties in the United
States, except those which opted out.84 The negotiation class was invalidated
by the Sixth Circuit for being beyond the scope of Rule 23,85 but it may be
resurrected in en banc review. The class had forty-nine city and county
representatives and operated against thirteen defendants.86 The negotiation
class allowed coordinated negotiation by all cities and counties in the U.S.,
thereby providing defendants an opportunity to settle and obtain global
peace. (Without the prospect of global peace, defendants worried that settling
with municipalities would only attract more claims.87) The negotiation class
could not litigate, as the certified claims and issues extended only to
settlement discussions.88 In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit declared that the
new device “fundamentally alter[ed] the nature of the MDL” and unfairly
coerced municipalities to settle.89
Ongoing attempts at global settlement have been unsuccessful.
II. THE BATTLE OVER THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
The opioid litigation is an unprecedented mammoth whose outcome will
affect millions of lives for years to come. And yet, as this paper will show,
the opioid litigation stands for something more. The way this litigation is
resolved bears implications for the future handling of public-health crises
and mass losses of life. Embedded in the final resolution will be a
determination about the scope of public health we are pursuing. Will we
obtain modest monetary relief for opioid victims, or will we pursue
something more?
To date, the litigation has been near-obsessed with speedy monetary
returns for opioid victims. The judge of the multidistrict proceedings has
disavowed other goals that would promote public health, such as trials,
transparency, injunctive relief, and accountability.90 Reactions from public

83. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
84. Ord. Certifying Negot. Class & Approving Notice at 1–3, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2019), ECF No. 2591.
85. In re Nat’l Prescription Opioid Litig., 976 F.3d 664, 677 (6th Cir. 2020).
86. Id. at 664.
87. See Alison Frankel, State AGs Pose Big Obstacle for Novel Opioids Negotiating Class
Proposal, REUTERS (June 26, 2019, 11:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otcopioids/state-ags-pose-big-obstacle-for-novel-opioids-negotiating-class-proposalidUSKCN1TR35R [https://perma.cc/7HMW-76NZ] (discussing how defendants are hesitant to
settle with plaintiffs because that would just lead to more claims).
88. Memorandum Op. Certifying Negot. Class at 2–4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2019), ECF No. 2590.
89. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d at 670.
90. See infra Section IV.A.1 (describing Judge Polster’s promotion of settlements); Aaron,
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health legal scholars have ranged from uncertain to furious.91 The sidelining
and relegation of important public health goals implies that the scope of
public health is narrow and that we will focus solely on redressing the harms
to people with opioid addiction. But public health litigation can and must
achieve more.
This Part will aim to bring previously disguised conversations to light,
rendering explicit the battle over the scope of public health. The opioid
litigation is a large participant in that conversation.
A. Public Health, Defined
Although we could dive right into what litigation outcomes would best
promote public health, it helps to be clear about what public health is.92 To
the author’s knowledge, no article has systematically attempted to consider
the scope of public health as applied to the opioid litigation, nor how the
scope of public health affects the relief sought.
Public health is a slippery concept. Its meaning and parameters differ by
country.93 Perhaps the most famous definition was offered by the Institute of
Medicine in a 1988 report:
Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the
conditions in which people can be healthy. This requires that
continuing and emerging threats to the health of the public be
successfully countered. These threats include immediate crises, such
as the AIDS epidemic; enduring problems, such as injuries and
chronic illness; and impending crises foreshadowed by such
developments as the toxic by-products of a modern economy.94
Public health appears to have two properties important for the purposes of
this article. First, it is broad and population based.95 Over time, public health

supra note 1, at 33 (stating that the opioid litigation focused on settlements but that another method
is necessary).
91. Compare Jennifer D. Oliva, Opioid Multidistrict Litigation Secrecy, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 663,
688–89 (2020) (discussing the importance of transparency and the public being informed of MDL
proceedings), with Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 362 (analyzing the role of the courts in the opioid
pandemic).
92. According to the well-known 1988 Institute of Medicine report on public health, one of the
largest barriers to achieving public health is “lack of consensus on the content of the public health
mission.” See COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE
FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 107 (1988).
93. See INST. OF MED., FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: INVESTING IN A HEALTHIER FUTURE 121
(2012) (“[E]ach country has its own definition of public health.”).
94. COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 92, at 1.
95. See Onyebuchi A. Arah, On the Relationship Between Individual and Population Health,
12 MED., HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 235, 235 (2009) (“[A] person’s health cannot be seen in isolation
but must be placed in [a] rich contextual web.”); cf. Thomas R. Frieden, The Future of Public
Health, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1748, 1748 (2015) (“The field of public health aims to improve the
health of as many people as possible as rapidly as possible.”).
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has moved from a concern over high-risk groups to acknowledging that most,
and perhaps all, people are at risk and may require public-health
interventions.96 Corollary to the population focus of public health is an
attunement not just to individuals, but to people’s broad situations, a concept
often referred to as the “ecological” view of public health.97
Second, it is future oriented.98 The actions, the laws, and the systems of
today “are irreversibly shaping the environments on which the survival of
future generations depend.”99 The future orientation of public health is
visible in the sheer fact that risks now lead to future harms.100 A rise in the
frequency of car accidents will cause more deaths not in seconds, but over
time in the future. Similarly, broad dissemination of cigarettes in the 1920s
and 1930s increased smoking but would only increase lung cancer rates
decades later.101 Public health is concerned with action now to improve
health later.102
Public health is generally considered a public good; that is, it is non-

96. See COMM. ON ASSURING THE HEALTH OF THE PUB. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, INST. OF MED.,
THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 46–48, 50 (2002) (addressing
moderate risks across an entire population may create greater public-health gains than addressing
only high-risk individuals).
97. See Wiley, supra note 9, at 222 (“The development of the now-dominant ‘ecological’ model
of health has been heavily influenced by epidemiology, which demonstrates that socially,
culturally, and materially disadvantaged people liver shorter, less healthy lives.”).
98. See Hilary Graham, Where Is the Future in Public Health?, 88 MILBANK Q. 149, 151 (2010)
(outlining public health’s future-oriented activities of preventing, prolonging, and promoting);
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 92, at 6, 18 (1988) (“The
committee has concluded that effective public health activities are essential to the health and wellbeing of the American people, now and in the future.”). Of note, the future orientation of public
health does not bar it from inquiry into the past. Understanding the past, including prior handling
of mass tort litigation, can assist in securing a healthy future. See Gabriel Scally & Justine Womack,
The Importance of the Past in Public Health, 58 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 751, 755
(2004) (concluding that how we record contemporary events can impact students’ understanding
of public health history in the future); Micah L. Berman, Using Opioid Settlement Proceeds for
Public Health: Lessons from the Tobacco Experience, 67 KAN. L. REV. 1029, 1029–30 (2019)
(explaining how some efforts to ensure specific spending of MSA funds were successful in the
short term but not sustained in the long term).
99. Graham, supra note 98, at 153.
100. Id. at 151.
101. See Prabhat Jha, Avoidable Global Cancer Deaths and Total Deaths from Smoking, 9
NATURE REVS.: CANCER 655, 658 (2009) (discussing global trends between increased smoking
rates and lung cancer deaths decades later).
102. Arguably, this could be conceived as improving health now. A person who quits smoking
immediately enjoys greater life expectancy even though their health is no different from the day
before. However, this article will consider such gains to be in “the future” because of the inherent
delayed payoff, which is a hallmark of prevention. See Rebecca Masters et al., Return on Investment
of Public Health Interventions: A Systematic Review, 71 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 827,
833 (2017) (“[P]ublic health interventions can offer surprisingly rapid returns, which may increase
further over the longer term.”).
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excludable and non-rivalrous.103 A person cannot be intentionally excluded
from a true public-health measure, and one person’s use of public health does
not reduce the benefit to others.
B. Battle over the Scope of Public Health: COVID-19
The opioid litigation is not taking place in a vacuum, but rather during one
of the most important public health moments in history.
Perhaps never in American history has the impact of public health been
felt so deeply, personally, and universally. The novel coronavirus has killed
hundreds of thousands of Americans and relegated many of us to our
homes.104 It is hard to spend one single day without remembering how life
used to be: grabbing a bite to eat with friends, social gatherings, church,
sports, dating. Behind our loss of a way of life is a recognition that our
actions affect others. One’s level of social distancing, mask-wearing
tendencies, and use of hand sanitizer can increase or decrease the local
infection rate. As a result, the idea that everyone is interconnected by public
health appears to be attaining a new collective significance. Public-health
analysis has become ubiquitous in media and popular discourse. In August
2020, more than eight in ten Americans reported that they regularly wore
masks in stores105—an action largely taken to protect others106—and are thus
participating in the collective effort of public health. Its economic
importance, too, has come into stark relief, as coronavirus-related
unemployment surged from 3.5 percent in February 2020 to 14.7 percent in
April 2020.107

103. See Sandro Galea, Public Health as a Public Good, B.U. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Jan. 10,
2016),
https://www.bu.edu/sph/news/articles/2016/public-health-as-a-public-good
[https://perma.cc/J3XB-K8U2] (“The classic understanding of a public good in economics . . . is a
good that is non-excludable and non-rivalrous, where no one can be excluded from its use and
where the use by one does not diminish the availability of the good to others.”).
104. See Holly Yan, More People Have Died from COVID-19 Than in the Past Five Flu
Seasons Combined. And Coronavirus Is Much More Contagious, CNN (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/06/health/flu-covid-19-deaths-comparison-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/P89Y-689S] (explaining the high rates of contagion and COVID-19 deaths); see
also COVID Data Tracker, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days [https://perma.cc/4UXDDPE8] (last visited Aug. 18, 2021) (providing the current number of COVID-19 deaths in the U.S.).
105. See Stephanie Kramer, More Americans Say They Are Regularly Wearing Masks in Stores
and Other Businesses, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/08/27/more-americans-say-they-are-regularly-wearing-masks-in-stores-and-otherbusinesses [https://perma.cc/HS65-N4YY] (describing mask-wearing trends throughout the United
States).
106. Angel N. Desai & David M. Aronoff, Masks and Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),
323 JAMA 2103, 2103 (2020).
107. Civilian
Unemployment
Rate,
U.S.
BUREAU
OF
LAB.
STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-unemployment-rate.htm
[https://perma.cc/3XPH-YDB9] (last visited Aug. 17, 2020).
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And yet COVID-19 is only the latest of several recent reminders of the
importance of public health that have left an imprint on the American
populace. From gun violence to lead-contaminated water to the affordablehousing crisis to the opioid epidemic and other addiction crises, there is no
shortage of reminders. COVID-19 may be the strongest, however, for its
near-universal impact on the American populace. This year, “public health”
broke records for the number of times it was searched in Google.108 Many
have described our current point in history as a “public health moment.”109
Concomitant with the rise of the salience of public health, there has been
increasing recognition of the roles played by structural forces and the law.110
Several months into the novel coronavirus’s arrival in the United States,
more than 80 percent of the populace supported social distancing, bans on
groups of more than ten people, and stay-at-home orders,111 despite the
inherent self-sacrifice. There have been sustained lawmaking efforts to
restrict guns and tax sugar-sweetened beverages.112 Recent research showed
that the return-on-investment of public-health interventions is 14.3 to 1, and
for nationwide interventions, the ratio is 27.2 to 1.113 Broad and futurelooking public-health policies are increasingly understood as basic
necessities.
However, as much progress as has been made, many continue to resist
public health, and conversations have not always encompassed the
characteristic depth or breadth of public health. COVID-19 measures
provoked protests and movement-organizing by right-wing groups.114 Mask-

108. GOOGLE TRENDS,
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=
public%20health [https://perma.cc/64LA-JLY4 ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
109. Michelle A. Williams, When Public Health Means Business, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. OF
PUB. HEALTH (Aug. 5, 2020), https://theforum.sph.harvard.edu/events/when-public-health-meansbusiness-4 [https://perma.cc/NXS5-63PB].
110. Wiley, supra note 9, at 210.
111. Mark É. Czeisler et al., Public Attitudes, Behaviors, and Beliefs Related to COVID-19,
Stay-at-Home Orders, Nonessential Business Closures, and Public Health Guidance—United
States, New York City, and Los Angeles, May 5–12, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 751, 753 (2020). Thus, while COVID-19 laws and policies have at times drawn protests and
criticism, a majority of Americans appear to support them. See id. (“Overall, 79.5% of respondents
in the U.S. cohort supported government-issued stay-at-home orders and nonessential business
closures . . . .”).
112. See Melissa Block, 2018 Brought a ‘Tectonic Shift’ in the Gun Control Movement,
Advocates Say, NPR (Dec. 26, 2018, 7:13 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/26/678248648/2018brought-a-tectonic-shift-in-the-gun-control-movement-advocates-say
[https://perma.cc/GX8ZAFP4] (discussing gun control movement and potential restrictions on buying and owning guns);
David A. Dana & Janice Nadler, Soda Taxes as a Legal and Social Movement, 13 NW. J. L. & SOC.
POL’Y 84, 106 (2018) (explaining why soda tax is a social movement that could better public
health).
113. Masters et al., supra note 102, at 827.
114. See Jason Wilson, The Rightwing Groups behind Wave of Protests against Covid-19
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wearing became politicized.115 Commentators of all political stripes have
weighed in on mask-wearing, often with acerbic language.116 With an
increasing number of people becoming absorbed in conversations about
masks and distancing, there has been even less attention dedicated to the
structural determinants of health that exacerbate our death tolls and cause
them to fall heavily on racial minorities.117 What is more, the root causes of
COVID-19 have received minimal media attention.
Dr. Anthony Fauci, who has been called the “world’s leading authority on
infectious disease”118 and who, from his seat in government, has advised the
public during the most uncertain moments of the COVID-19 pandemic, has
been invested in a larger conversation about the root causes of COVID-19.
Although Dr. Fauci is less well known for these broader considerations, it is
not for lack of trying. Our collective inattention reveals the shallowness of
the mainstream conception of public health. In a thirteen-page article in Cell
published in September 2020, Dr. Fauci proffered his view of the
foundational causes of COVID-19 and other emerging pandemic diseases.119
By connecting COVID-19 with other “emergences” (not emergencies), he
suggested these diseases “reflect our increasing inability to live in harmony
with nature.”120 He argued modern social features such as overcrowding,
urbanization, intensive farming, burning of forests, and global poverty have

Restrictions,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
17,
2020,
9:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/far-right-coronavirus-protests-restrictions
[https://perma.cc/UJ4U-MQFH] (discussing right-wing protests throughout the country against
COVID-19 restrictions).
115. Ryan Lizza & Daniel Lippman, Wearing a Mask Is for Smug Liberals. Refusing to Is for
Reckless
Republicans.,
POLITICO
(May
1,
2020,
4:30
AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/01/masks-politics-coronavirus-227765
[https://perma.cc/QTB4-B3DY].
116. Compare Catherine Pearlman, Opinion, Hey. Wear the Damn Mask, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/06/opinions/wear-the-damn-mask-pearlman/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ESC9-2792] (last updated May 27, 2020) (“Wearing a mask in public is an act of
respect for your fellow humans.”), with Scott Morefield, 8 Reasons Why I Don’t Wear a Mask and
You Probably Shouldn’t Either, TOWNHALL (June 1, 2020, 12:01 AM),
https://townhall.com/columnists/scottmorefield/2020/06/01/8-reasons-why-i-dont-wear-a-maskand-you-probably-shouldnt-either-n2569786 [https://perma.cc/5MAB-SU4C] (stating that even if
wearing a mask can protect against coronavirus, other factors outweigh the risk).
117. See Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Law, Structural Racism, and the COVID-19
Pandemic, 7 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 2 (2020) (analyzing racial and ethnic minorities are
disproportionately affected by pandemics and specifically by the COVID-19 pandemic).
118. See Anthony Fauci & John Whyte, Dr. Fauci: Not Caring Means You Are Propagating a
Pandemic,
WEBMD
(July
17,
2020),
https://www.webmd.com/coronavirus-incontext/video/anthony-fauci [https://perma.cc/MC35-CJAJ] (discussing the importance of
preventing COVID-19 exposure and spread to avoid extending the pandemic).
119. See David M. Morens & Anthony S. Fauci, Emerging Pandemic Diseases: How We Got
to COVID-19, 182 CELL 1077, 1077 (2020) (explaining the causes and processes that lead to
pandemics, including the potential cause of the COVID-19 pandemic).
120. Id. at 1089.
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increased our susceptibility to rapidly spreading disease.121 According to Dr.
Fauci, “The COVID-19 pandemic is yet another reminder . . . that in a
human-dominated world, in which our human activities represent
aggressive, damaging, and unbalanced interactions with nature, we will
increasingly provoke new disease emergences.”122
That these “environmental determinants of human health,” as Dr. Fauci
called them,123 have scarcely entered the popular vocabulary suggests the
superficiality with which we as a nation have considered broad public health
aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Experts have been warning about the
possibility of new zoonoses—diseases that jump from animals to humans—
for more than a decade.124 Another recent example is HIV, which led to a
global pandemic that killed millions and scarred the LGBTQ community, all
originating from a chimpanzee.125
A broad view of public health would also consider corporate financial
incentives. Corporations hold enormous sway over the U.S. population,
including over the workplace environment—the amount of ventilation,
testing, spacing between employees, provision of personal-protective
equipment (“PPE”), healthcare benefits,126 the quantity of sick leave,
whether employees receive time to isolate after falling ill, and so forth. In
the absence of universal government standards, corporate liability can
incentivize corporations to protect their workers, and by extension the
public, from local outbreaks. Outbreaks at meat-processing plants are
instructive, as these plants remained open throughout the pandemic.127 One
South Dakota meatpacking plant experienced an outbreak of 929 cases, or
25.6 percent of the plant’s workforce, after failing to exercise protective
controls such as social distancing.128 Multiple Centers for Disease Control

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Anderson Cooper, Tracking Deadly Viruses’ Spread from Animals to Humans, CNN
(Dec. 9, 2008, 4:56 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/08/pip.zoonotics
/index.html [http://perma.cc/5LPA-EWHV] (explaining that although transfer has happened
historically, humans’ global travel has accelerated disease transfer).
125. Id.
126. About 55 percent of the U.S. population receives employer-sponsored healthcare.
KATHERINE KEISLER-STARKEY & LISA N. BUNCH, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE
UNITED
STATES:
2019,
at
4
(2020),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p60-271.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K26H-A5FM].
127. Jonathan W. Dyal et al., COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing
Facilities—19 States, April 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 557, 557 (2020).
128. See Jonathan Steinberg et al., COVID-19 Outbreak Among Employees at a Meat
Processing Facility—South Dakota, March–April 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 1015, 1016 (2020) (describing outbreak at a South Dakota meat-processing facility and its
likely causes).
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(CDC) reports on meatpacking plants found a 9.1 percent infection rate, with
87 percent of cases among minority workers.129 Journalists decried
meatpacking plants as “hot spots” and “hotbeds.”130 A Bloomberg
Businessweek report attributed these outcomes in part to regulatory inaction
at the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
disempowered by the Trump Administration and under siege from the meat
industry.131 In this low-regulation environment, tort incentives to protect
workers are essential. Members of Congress who propose legislation
removing financial incentives that protect workers are arguably harming
public health,132 even when the legislation also contains financial relief. A
broad view of public health would recognize that powerful financial
incentives to protect public health must not be sold for quick dollars.
COVID-19 has measurably increased public appreciation for public
health, which is an incremental success. But individual measures such as
masks and distancing are not enough to protect public health, and they never
will be. Our collective obsession with individual contributions to the
pandemic, combined with ongoing efforts to erase corporate liability and
general ignorance of the environmental determinants of health, suggest a
narrowing of the possible scope of public health. True public health must be
capacious in scope, aiming to protect all Americans now and into the future.
It is in this new public-health era, superimposed over a battle for the scope
of public health, that attorneys and judges in the opioid litigation are making
decisions that touch the lives of the American people.
C. Battle over the Scope of Public Health: Opioid Litigation
The opioid litigation is one venue for debates about the scope of public
health. To date, the opioid litigation has emphasized quick monetary relief

129. Michelle A. Waltenburg et al., Update: COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry
Processing Facilities—United States, April–May 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
887, 887 (2020).
130. Amelia Lucas, CDC Says 9% of Meatpacking Plant Workers Have Been Diagnosed with
Covid-19, CNBC (July 7, 2020, 7:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/07/cdc-says-9percentof-meatpacking-plant-workers-have-been-diagnosed-with-covid-19.html [http://perma.cc/86AQQMLS]; Anna Stewart et al., Why Meat Processing Plants Have Become Covid-19 Hotbeds, CNN
(June 27, 2020, 3:32 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/27/health/meat-processing-plantscoronavirus-intl/index.html [http://perma.cc/B8SM-SUEB].
131. See Polly Mosendz et al., U.S. Meat Plants Are Deadly as Ever, with No Incentive to
Change,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(June
18,
2020,
3:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-06-18/how-meat-plants-were-allowed-tobecome-coronavirus-hot-spots [http://perma.cc/TE92-VSQT] (explaining how OSHA ordered its
staff to inspect only front-line facilities during the pandemic, which did not include meat plants).
132. See Werner & Hamburger, supra note 16 (discussing how worker advocates have argued
Republican-proposed liability-shield legislation would give immunity to businesses that operate
unreasonably and unsafely, which would cause returning workers and consumers to risk COVID19 infection).
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for opioid victims (Figure 2). Judge Daniel Polster has expressed his fear
that discovery and hearings on the merits would forestall relief, and “another
50- or 60,000 people are going to die . . . .”133 Similarly, most literature has
focused on people with opioid addiction.134 One can see here the
“identifiable victim effect,” in which people ascribe more value to saving
identifiable lives as opposed to statistical or theoretical ones.135
Figure 2: The most agreed-upon beneficiaries of the opioid litigation
are people with opioid addiction.

Nobody would contest the importance of providing addiction treatment
and related services, but it is worth considering what is lost in the rush for
funding, and whether we must cast away our hopes for the release of
documents, injunctive relief, accountability, and the like. The broad version
of public health would include these goals, even if they stand to help different
types of beneficiaries (Figure 3).

133. Transcript of Proc., supra note 5, at 12–13.
134. See, e.g., Cheryl Healton et al., The Opioid Crisis, Corporate Responsibility, and Lessons
From the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, 322 JAMA 2071, 2072 (2019) (“[O]pioid
settlement and judgment resources should be dedicated, virtually in their entirety, to ameliorate the
opioid epidemic.”); James G. Hodge Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, Guiding Industry Settlements of
Opioid Litigation, 45 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 432, 435 (2019) (discussing the recent $270
million settlement Purdue Pharma agreed to pay the State of Oklahoma to treat drug use and
addiction); Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 361 (explaining how monetary damages remain
paramount because of the overwhelming medical costs); Abdullah Shihipar & Brandon D.L.
Marshall, Opinion, What the Opioid Epidemic Can Learn from Tobacco Settlement, WASH. POST
(July
17,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2019/07/17/opioids-settlements-roll-money-must-go-where-its-needed-most
[http://perma.cc/T5NB-VR5X] (arguing that opioid agreements should be directed to remediation
and not states’ general revenue); see also Derek Carr et al., Reducing Harm Through Litigation
Against Opioid Manufacturers? Lessons from the Tobacco Wars, 133 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 207,
209–10 (2018) (comparing opioid litigation’s prospective damages with those of tobacco
litigation’s master settlement agreement (MSA), and noting the MSA’s “mixed results” from a
public health perspective); Berman, supra note 98, at 1058–59 (“[A] global opioid settlement
agreement may be a once in-a-generation opportunity to secure funds needed to rebuild the
country’s decimated public health infrastructure.”).
135. Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect”, 14 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 236 (1997).
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Figure 3: Possible beneficiaries of the opioid litigation.

Similarly, despite public health’s concern with the future, scholarly
opinions on the time axis have varied. Some commentators have encouraged
opioid addiction prevention, an extremely important goal.136 Few have
broadened their scope to include future addiction crises.137 Most authors are
not explicit about the time component of public health (Figure 4).

136. See, e.g., Cheryl Healton, The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement—Strategic Lessons
for Addressing Public Health Problems, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 997, 999 (2018) (advocating
preventative interventions beyond litigation to achieve public-health goals); see also Brief of Amici
Curiae in Support of Settlement with Favorable Pub. Health Outcomes at 21–23, In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 2019), ECF No. 1626
(recommending improvements in pain management and addressing root causes of problematic
substance use and overdose).
137. See Terry, supra note 56, at 667 (“[A]ny settlement must address the negative social
determinants of health that lie at the root of the opioid epidemic and build healthier environments
that will reduce the likelihood of future addiction crises.”); see also Berman, supra note 98, at
1058–59 (discussing an opportunity to rebuild the public-health infrastructure).

2021]

Public Health in the Opioid Litigation

37

Figure 4: Possible beneficiaries of the opioid litigation across time.

These models raise fundamental questions about the scope of the opioid
litigation. Do we want to release industry documents that facilitate research
into how the opioid crisis arose, so that future babies might enter a world that
is safer and healthier? Do we want to establish accountability for companies
that contribute to a massive loss of life, so that future companies that sell
addicting products will be on notice of the consequences? Or, from a
financial perspective, how much of the funds will we invest in treatment of
people with addiction now, and how much will we allocate to research and
prevention? These questions are not easy, but if we want to protect public
health, we must ask them.
As with COVID-19, the scope of public health reflected in the opioid
litigation carries enormous consequences for law, ethics, and human life.
From a legal and ethical perspective, the opioid litigation carries duties to
broad public health.138 Failure to achieve these duties indicates the litigation
is not aligned with fundamental tenets of justice, equality, and a well society.
The opioid litigation holds great promise to change incentive structures and
alter the operation of markets for addicting products. According to several
prominent opioid experts, our systems and lawyers have “ignor[ed] the
underlying drivers of drug consumption,” such as the social determinants of
health.139 “Until we adopt this framework,” they stated, “we will continue to

138. See infra Part III (discussing public-health duties).
139. Dasgupta et al., supra note 62, at 182.
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fail in our efforts to turn the tide of the opioid crisis.”140 The opioid litigation
presents an opportunity to fight for the properly expanded scope of public
health that incorporates root-cause analysis. Superficial pots of money that
do not address root causes are insufficient to solve our country’s serious
public-health emergencies. Further, a pot of money is excludable and
rivalrous—suggesting private health as opposed to public health.141
As will be shown, the opioid litigation’s players have the duty to pursue
broad public health beyond monetary relief.142 These actors’ conduct will
create lasting precedent and law that will be cited for years to come. In
unprecedented litigation over a public-health emergency of mammoth
proportion, this paper will argue we must pursue broad public health.
III. PUBLIC HEALTH DUTIES
This Part will explore the litigation’s duty to promote broad public health.
It will proffer three arguments that such a duty exists and refute two possible
concerns surrounding those arguments. In Part IV, this paper will assess
whether the litigation is meeting its duty to public health.
A. The Duty to Public Health
This section will articulate three mutually reinforcing arguments that
establish tight links between the litigation and a broad conception of public
health across people and time (Figure 5).
Figure 5: This section seeks to demonstrate the tight connection
between the opioid litigation and broad public health.

One argument is grounded in a public health understanding of the opioid
crisis, the second is based on the connection between the litigation’s players

140. Id.
141. See supra Section II.A (explaining that public health is a public good).
142. Infra Part III.
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and public health, and the third involves showing that tort law is more than
private.
1. A Public-Health Understanding of the Opioid Crisis
While it may initially seem plausible that the opioid litigation is most
intimately tied to the set of people who have or had a prescription opioid
addiction, this conception does not stand up to scrutiny. The opioid MDL is
called In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation. So, why is it readily
acknowledged that people whose addiction involved illicit use should benefit
from litigation proceeds?143 Should we not confine relief to people who used
prescription opioids and, in delegating relief, consider which company
created, which company distributed, and which pharmacy dispensed the drug
that hooked each victim? Such a fine-grained analysis is unnecessary
because a larger view of public health indicates that the funds can be used to
ameliorate the opioid crisis holistically, including patients who not once used
a prescription opioid.
Now consider an extension: Would giving relief to people with stimulant
addiction be acceptable? (Stimulants include Adderall and Ritalin—drugs
for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)—as well as cocaine and
methamphetamines.) The arguments to do so are more compelling than they
may seem at first glance. Imagine one person who has used stimulants only
and one person who has used heroin only. Neither has used prescription
opioids, yet only the person who has used heroin will benefit from the
prescription-opioid litigation under prevailing norms. Ultimately, they both
suffer from addiction and arguably hold an equally strong (or weak) claim.
And from a public health lens, the two cases are not so dissimilar. Stimulants
are currently experiencing rising prescriptions amidst aggressive marketing,
are frequently diverted,144 and are causing death at a rapidly increasing
rate.145 Between 2016 and 2017, cocaine deaths rose 34.4 percent and other
stimulant deaths rose 33.3 percent.146 And just in February 2020, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) submitted a warning letter to the maker of
the stimulant PROCENTRA (dextroamphetamine sulfate), asserting the
manufacturer failed in its promotion “to include any risk information about

143. See, e.g., Hodge & Gostin, supra note 134, at 435 (arguing that settlement funds should be
used to mitigate the opioid epidemic generally).
144. Scott E. Hadland et al., Analysis of Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing of Stimulants, 2014
Through 2018, 174 JAMA PEDIATRICS 385, 385 (2020).
145. BROOKE HOOTS ET AL., ADDICTION, THE RISE IN NON-FATAL AND FATAL OVERDOSES
INVOLVING STIMULANTS WITH AND WITHOUT OPIOIDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/?term=31912625 [http://perma.cc/9EUE-G2GJ].
146. Id.
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the drug.”147 Similarly, misrepresenting the risks of opioids was a major
contributor to the opioid crisis.148
Further, there is substantial overlap between opioid and stimulant users.
Most overdose deaths involve multiple drugs.149 Of the more than 13,000
cocaine-related deaths in 2017, 72.7 percent involved an opioid.150
Conversely, only 17 percent of overdoses involve only opioids, whereas 36
percent involve opioids with stimulants in studies conducted between 2014
and 2015.151 As written by two psychiatrists, “Viewing opioid addiction as a
stand-alone disease without consideration of other substance use or
comorbid psychiatric pathology provides only a limited perspective. Rather,
dual disorders are the rule and not the exception . . . .”152 Because stimulant
deaths have risen in the wake of the opioid epidemic, some scholars have
named stimulants as the next wave of an overarching, multi-decade drug
overdose epidemic.153
Given this substantial overlap, it is well within the scope of litigation relief
to establish addiction medicine centers that broadly facilitate the treatment
and study of addiction and its regulation. For comparison, consider that, in
the sugar and obesity context, it would make sense to use sugar litigation
funds (assuming they existed) to create farmers’ markets, which do not
directly reduce sugar intake. Not providing funding for stimulant addiction
may lead to the odd situation of a person with dual addiction seeing a
physician and only receiving treatment for opioid addiction, leaving

147. Letter from Andrew S.T. Haffer, Director, Off. of Prescription Drug Promotion, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., to Stefan Antonsson, CEO, Outlook Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/warningletters/outlook-pharmaceuticals-inc-605071-02212020 [http://perma.cc/UQM8-LU6D].
148. Kolodny et al., supra note 11, at 562.
149. Christopher M. Jones et al., Vital Signs: Demographic and Substance Use Trends Among
Heroin Users—United States, 2002–2013, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP 719, 722
(2015); Bobbi Jo H. Yarborough et al., Understanding Opioid Overdose Characteristics Involving
Prescription and Illicit Opioids: A Mixed Methods Analysis, 167 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
49, 54 (2016).
150. HOOTS ET AL., supra note 145, at 3, 7.
151. Joshua A. Barocas et al., Sociodemographic Factors and Social Determinants Associated
with Toxicology Confirmed Polysubstance Opioid-Related Deaths, 200 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 59, 60 (2019).
152. A. Benjamin Srivastava & Mark S. Gold, Beyond Supply: How We Must Tackle the Opioid
Epidemic, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 269, 270 (2018).
153. See F. Scott Hall & Klaus A. Miczek, Emerging Threats in Addiction: Will Novel
Psychoactive Substances Contribute to Exacerbating the Ongoing Drug Overdose Epidemic?, 236
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 839, 842 (2019) (“[O]ne of the ways in which the drug epidemic may
continue to worsen is through the combined use of illicit drugs, particularly stimulants and
opioids.”); see also Christine Vestal, It’s Not Just Opioids. Deaths from Cocaine and Meth Are
Surging, PBS (May 16, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/its-not-justopioids-deaths-from-cocaine-and-meth-are-surging [http://perma.cc/2GRC-WQQ4] (“It turns out
that the same lethal drug that has been driving the nation’s spiraling opioid epidemic is also causing
an historic surge in overdose deaths among cocaine users.”).
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stimulant addiction unaddressed. More likely, however, a physician would
(and should) treat both problems at an office visit as part of comprehensive
addiction care. Oklahoma has implemented this idea by spending $100
million of its opioid litigation returns to endow a new addiction treatment
and research center at Oklahoma State University.154
More generally, a broad view would recognize that public health and
medical practice are essential goods that must be protected from undue
influence. Any American could be in the hospital tomorrow receiving
surgery for an inflamed appendix, breast cancer, an aortic aneurysm, or any
number of illnesses. Those surgeries could require the use of opioids, and the
way they are prescribed affects the patient’s risk. Larger post-surgical opioid
prescriptions are associated with greater frequency of addiction,155 and
prescriptions generally provide far more pills than patients use.156 One
systematic review of post-surgical opioid use estimated 42% to 71% of
opioid pills go unused.157 As mentioned, much of this overprescription is due
to overzealous marketing, which led doctors to believe opioids were more
effective and less dangerous than they truly are.158 Tort law can protect
patients by enforcing the rule of law with regard to safe marketing of
addicting substances.159 The resulting disincentives could discourage future
deceptive marketing of opioids and shield medical practice from undue
influence. Therefore, accountability and deterrence, which fall within the
purview of tort law,160 could help address derivative problems that helped
produce the opioid crisis. The opioid litigation is tied not just to individual
opioid victims, but to broader public-health outcomes and the integrity of

154. Jan Hoffman, Purdue Pharma and Sacklers Reach $270 Million Settlement in Opioid
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/health/opioidspurdue-pharma-oklahoma.html [http://perma.cc/VJ3N-YT6J].
155. Jennifer H. Kuo, Use and Misuse of Opioids After Endocrine Surgery Operations, ANNALS
SURGERY 7–8 (Jan. 14, 2020) doi: 10.1097/SLA.0000000000003777; Alexander A. Brescia et al.,
Impact of Prescribing on New Persistent Opioid Use After Cardiothoracic Surgery, 108 ANNALS
THORACIC SURGERY 1107, 1107 (2019).
156. E.g., Ryan Howard et al., Association of Opioid Prescribing with Opioid Consumption
After Surgery in Michigan, 154 JAMA SURGERY 1, 4 (2019); Jeffrey Rodgers, Opioid Consumption
Following Outpatient Upper Extremity Surgery, 37A J. HAND SURGERY 645, 646–47 (2012);
Pamela Wendel et al., More Than Half of Opioids Prescribed to Pediatric Patients After
Ambulatory Knee Surgery Are Unused, 17 J. OPIOID MGM’T 311, 311 (2021).
157
Mark C. Bicket, Jane J. Long & Peter J. Provonost, Prescription Opioid Analgesics
Commonly Unused After Surgery A Systematic Review, 152 JAMA SURGERY 1066, 1066 (2017).
158. See Kolodny et al., supra note 11, at 566 (“Unfortunately, the campaign to encourage OPR
[opioid pain reliever] prescribing has left many health care providers with a poor appreciation of
opioid risks, especially the risk of addiction, and an overestimation of opioid benefits.”).
159. The companion article discusses the rule of law in greater detail. Aaron, supra note 1.
160. See generally Aaron, supra note 1; see also Andrew Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75
ALBANY L. REV. 181, 184–85 (2011) (Though “there is no single comprehensive juried study that
looks broadly at the deterrent effect of tort law,” the literature does conclude that the tort system is
fully defensible as a primary deterrent mechanism).

42

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 53

modern medicine.
2. The Litigation’s Players Are Connected to Public Health
This paper will argue that all parties to the opioid litigation possess some
ethical duty161 to consider public health, either in the litigation or their prior
capacities (the conduct for which they are brought to court). These arguments
may appear more or less persuasive to different readers. The easiest cases
are government actors and public-facing attorneys. However, this section
will aim to show that defendants and private plaintiffs, too, owe a duty to
public health. In any event, the larger point is that one must grapple with the
litigation’s fundamental connection to public health, which persists even if
one believes that one or more parties have no duty to further it.
i. Government Actors
Governmental entities adjudicating a mass-health harm inherently have
strong ties to public health. State and local attorneys have become some of
the most powerful voices in the litigation due to their sheer numbers, as well
as their special standing with courts.162
State attorneys general have played an important historical role in public
health for decades. In the 1980s, state attorneys general moved from being
fairly docile and reactive to quite muscular government actors.163 Because of
the Reagan administration’s “New Federalism” philosophy, many
authorities previously exercised by federal agencies fell to the states.164 State
attorneys general saw their powers grow as they filled in numerous
regulatory holes,165 blooming into a diverse jurisdiction across
environmental issues, consumer protection, civil rights, antitrust,166 health,167

161. A legal duty is likely present for many parties as well, exemplified by the very laws and
claims at play in the opioid MDL.
162. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (holding that Massachusetts
has a “special solicitude” in federal courts to protect its state interests); Edgar Aliferov, Note, The
Role of Direct-Injury Government-Entity Lawsuits in the Opioid Litigation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
1141, 1173 (2018) (“Direct-injury government-entity claims circumvent the obstacles that have
hindered other forms of litigation against opioid companies.”).
163. Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 67 (2018).
164. Id.; RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 10 (2007).
165. Lemos & Young, supra note 163, at 67–68.
166. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General,
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2452 (2006) (“In some states . . . the
Attorney General has statutory authority to bring consumer protection, environmental, civil rights,
civil fraud, securities, and antitrust actions . . . .”).
167. E.g., Lacy H. Thornburg, Changes in the State’s Law Firm: The Powers, Duties and
Operations of the Office of the Attorney General, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 343, 363 (1990)
(explaining that the North Carolina Attorney General’s duty to protect public health is encompassed
by its duty for environmental protection).
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and much more. In parallel, state attorney-general lawsuits have waxed in
importance amidst rising procedural barriers to other forms of aggregate
litigation.168 As part of their expanding responsibilities across multiple areas,
attorneys general have pursued lawsuits aimed at mitigating many publichealth problems, including alcohol, tobacco, prescription drug misuse, and
health-care fraud.169 In 1982, the Supreme Court blessed the pursuit of public
health by attorneys general.170 All in all, state attorneys general have a direct
connection to public health, both historically and as constructed by the
modern regulatory state. This connection was solidified in the opioid context
when almost every state attorney general sued opioid companies.171
Collectively, they represented almost the entire American public.
Local governments, too, have a strong connection to public health.
Although they have seen a rise and fall in power with fluctuations in funding,
they have historically played an important, and perhaps essential, role in
public health.172 However, the last two decades have seen a troubling rise in
what has been coined “the New Preemption,” in which state legislatures pass
sweeping and sometimes punitive restrictions of local governments and
officials.173 Many of these preemptive laws block public-health regulation of
lucrative industries, such as tobacco products, soda, and factory farms.174

168. Lemos & Young, supra note 163, at 72; Aliferov, supra note 162, 1152–56.
169. Lainie Rutkow & Stephen P. Teret, The Potential for State Attorneys General to Promote
the Public’s Health: Theory, Evidence, and Practice, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 267, 269 (2011);
see Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Kelly D. Brownell, Advancing Public Health Obesity Policy Through
State Attorneys General, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 425, 426 (2011) (explaining that attorneys
general were major contributors in litigation around the U.S. tobacco industry and other publichealth matters); see also Steven K. Berenson, Government Lawyer as Cause Lawyer: A Study of
Three High Profile Government Lawsuits, 86 DENVER U. L. REV. 457, 458 (2009) (“[G]overnment
lawyers may invoke their public authority to initiate their own legal campaigns designed to alter
some aspect of the social, economic, or political status quo.”).
170. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[A] State has a
quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-beingboth physical and economicof its residents
in general.”).
171. Walters, supra note 70.
172. See Drew E. Altman & Douglas H. Morgan, The Role of State and Local Government in
Health, 2 HEALTH AFFS. 7, 19–20 (1983) (showing that 3,071 local health departments operated in
forty-six states and spent $2.438 billion in 1981 to provide services typically including “public
health nursing, sanitation, communicable disease control, epidemiology, health statistics and
records, school health services, and home health care”).
173. Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1997
(2018).
174. Id. at 2000; Jennifer L. Pomeranz & Mark Pertschuk, State Preemption: A Significant and
Quiet Threat to Public Health in the United States, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 900, 900 (2017)
(“[M]ultiple industries are working on a 50-state strategy to enact state laws preempting local
regulation.”); see generally Eric Crosby et al. State Preemption: An Emerging Threat to Local
Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Taxation, 111 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 677 (2021); see also Eric Gorovitz
et al., Preemption or Prevention?: Lessons from Efforts to Control Firearms, Alcohol, and
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The pattern of deregulation stands in remarkable similarity to the reasons for
the rise of the state attorney general, and it helps explain why local
governments are turning to litigation.
Just as every state is represented in the opioid litigation, so has been
almost every city. In September 2019, Judge Polster certified a nationwide
Rule 23(b)(3)175 “Negotiation Class,” encompassing all cities and counties
in the United States.176 Except for the 541 cities that opted out, the remaining
98 percent of 34,000 local governments became engaged in the opioid
litigation.177 Collectively, these local governments, like the state
governments, represented almost the entire American public. The final fate
of the negotiation class remains tied up in judicial review,178 but, remarkably,
it inducted nearly every American municipality into the opioid litigation.
Beyond state and local governments, individual government employees
are participants in the litigation. Judges are government employees with
duties to the public. All federal judges take an oath to administer justice.179
Judge Polster himself has acknowledged the public-health role of the
litigation,180 even if his conception of public health is more confined to the
current opioid crisis than the broad conception generally characterizing
public health. Judge Polster has also commissioned several special masters
who serve the litigation, wield considerable judicial power (including the
authority to issue rulings),181 and share in the governmental duty to justice.
The strongest counterargument to public-health duties is that the
litigation’s government actors have strictly defined roles. Under this logic,

Tobacco, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 36, 37 (1998).
Recent advances in community-based public health policy have created a surge in the
politics of preemption. Recognizing the power of local public health regulation to restrict
use or possession of, or access to, their products, advocates for the tobacco, firearms and
alcohol industries have put tremendous resources into state and federal campaigns to
preempt local regulatory authority and erode the foundation of community-based
prevention on which public health has traditionally stood.
Id.
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
176. Ord. Certifying Negot. Class & Approving Notice, supra note 84, at 1–3. For further details
on the negotiation class, see supra Section I.B.
177. Tom Hals, U.S. Regions Hard Hit by Opioids to Ditch Class Action, Pursue Own Lawsuits,
REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigation/u-sregions-hard-hit-by-opioids-to-ditch-class-action-pursue-own-lawsuits-idUSKBN1Y72C6
[https://perma.cc/N4AQ-F6G7]. Given the invalidation of the negotiation class, it is unclear
whether these governments will continue to hold an informal role in the litigation, or whether the
negotiation class will be revived on appeal.
178. See supra Section I.B (explaining that the negotiation class may be resurrected in en banc
review even though the Sixth Circuit invalidated it).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 453.
180. Transcript of Proc., supra note 5, at 4.
181. Appointment Ord. at 1, 4, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 11, 2018), ECF No. 69.
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the federal courts’ role is established by Article III (to be discussed later),182
and state and local governments should recoup their costs from the opioid
crisis in so-called direct-injury or proprietary claims.183 Public-healthoriented causes of action, like public nuisance, step on legislative terrain.184
Therefore, government litigants must support intrinsic government interests
rather than public health.185
This critique is asking a deeper question about the role of government and
its attorneys. Is it plausible that an individual whose city and state
governments are participating in the litigation is represented by neither?
What is government for? According to James Madison, “[T]he public good,
the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be
pursued; and . . . no form of government whatever has any other value than
as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object.”186 This fundamental duty
of governments to serve the public does not exempt their attorneys. These
attorneys are not necessarily subservient to the governments they serve;
rather, government attorneys have historically been thought of as the
people’s attorneys.187 And while recouping funds lost during the crisis is one
role of government litigation, another role is filing claims on behalf of the
health of the people.188 The role of government litigation in pursuing public
health is historically established.189 Less formally, most people would
believe that if their state and local governments are participating in litigation,
their interests must be considered.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that multiple government actors in
the opioid litigation possess intimate connections with public health.

182. Infra Section III.B.2.
183. See Aliferov, supra note 162, at 1156 (“Government-entity lawsuits against opioid
companies are reactive responses that seek to recover damages incurred from the opioid
epidemic.”).
184. Luther J. Strange III, A Prescription for Disaster: How Local Governments’ Abuse of
Public Nuisance Claims Wrongly Elevates Courts and Litigants into a Policy-Making Role and
Subverts the Equitable Administration of Justice, 70 S.C. L. REV. 517, 518 (2019).
185. Generally, government claims can be “proprietary,” i.e., pertaining to the government’s
own interest, or parens patriae, i.e., made on behalf of the people. Morgan A. McCollum, Local
Government Plaintiffs and the Opioid Multi-District Litigation, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 938, 961–62
(2019). However, the distinction may be more legal than principled. See Aliferov, supra note 162,
at 1178 (arguing direct-injury government claims are nonetheless representative).
186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 235 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
187. Note, Government Counsel and Their Obligations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1429 (2008).
188. Cf. McCollum, supra note 185, at 961–62 (acting to recoup lost funds vindicates
government interests while acting on the public’s behalf and in its interest).
189. Rutkow & Teret, supra note 169, at 270; cf. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (holding that a state must express a quasi-sovereign interest in the action,
such as the health and well-being of its residents or not being discriminatorily denied its rightful
status within the federal system).
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ii. Private Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys
In addition to government plaintiffs, private plaintiffs and their attorneys
have a relationship with public health. So-called private attorneys general,
or private attorneys who sue for damages, have been defended on the basis
that their conduct is socially beneficial—not merely to their clients, but to
the public as a whole (e.g., deterrence).190 It may be difficult for plaintiffs to
receive significant financial returns without creating at least a mild publichealth deterrent effect.191 In other words, there is no clean separation between
private plaintiffs and the policy impact of the litigation.192 Therefore,
“private” actors are already operating in a quasi-public capacity.
Further, many claims asserted by “private” plaintiffs are public healthoriented. Public nuisance claims, for example, require interference with a
public right, i.e., a right common to the general public and enjoyed by many
people.193 Claims under the RICO Act have a history in public health,
notably in the federal government’s litigation against tobacco companies.194
But RICO also leverages private parties to investigate, illuminate, and deter
organizational misconduct.195 Claims under the Controlled Substances Act
are grounded in violations of public-health laws stipulating how addicting
substances are to be handled and sold.196 Plaintiffs leveraged these causes of
action, then specifically invoked the importance of public health in their
complaints. For example, Rush Health Systems of Mississippi asserted
defendants caused the “deaths and health ruination of hundreds of thousands
of citizens” and thereby “foreseeably caused damages to RUSH” through
unreimbursed medical costs.197 Medical Mutual of Ohio argued defendants’
conduct caused “economic, social and emotional damage to virtually every

190. See William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2151 (2004) (claiming that private attorneys general perform a
supplemental function by multiplying damages).
191. Popper, supra note 160, at 200.
192. Michelle L. Richards, Pills, Public Nuisance, and Parens Patriae: Questioning the
Propriety of the Posture of the Opioid Litigation, 54 U. RICH. L. REV. 405, 459 (2020). See supra
Section II.A for further critique of the public-private distinction.
193. Richard C. Ausness, The Current State of Opioid Litigation, 70 S.C. L. REV. 565, 567–68
(2019).
194. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 430, 903 (D.D.C. 2006),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.D.C. 2009) (showing that the government
successfully brought RICO action against cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related trade
organizations for defrauding the public by making inaccurate statements regarding the health
effects of smoking).
195. Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO, Corruption and White-Collar Crime, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 523,
532–33 (2013).
196. Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL’Y 5, 10–12 (2013).
197. Complaint at 3, Rush Health Sys., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 3:17-cv-1012 (S.D. Miss.
Dec. 13, 2017), ECF No. 1.
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community in Ohio and in the United States,” then leapt into a discussion of
tortious behavior damaging the company.198 Implicitly, these plaintiffs were
leveraging the public-health harms of the opioid crisis to justify their
lawsuits.
From a procedural perspective, MDLs place some private plaintiffs and
their attorneys into a supervisory role, with responsibility for decisions that
affect other people’s claims.199 In 2017, Judge Polster approved an Executive
Committee, a group of lawyers that manages the litigation for all MDL
plaintiffs and is intended to be representative of the MDL’s diversity.200
Similarly, in the ongoing bankruptcy proceeding for Purdue
Pharmaceuticals, four members of the nine-member bankruptcy creditor
committee are victims of the opioid crisis, including a man in recovery and
a mother who lost a son to overdose.201 Again, private actors have entered
quasi-public roles.
In sum, plaintiffs and their attorneys inevitably set deterrence policy.
Many of their claims lie in public health. And they frequently serve in publicfacing roles. Their connection with public health is substantial.
iii. Defendants
There is increasing recognition that corporations owe the public a duty. In
2018, Laurence Fink, CEO of the investment firm BlackRock, sent a historic
letter to the world’s biggest corporate executives.202 Fink’s letter exhorted
companies to contribute to the common good if they sought continued
investment from BlackRock.203 Fink referenced a popular demand for “a
positive contribution to society”—a line that sparked months of
conversation.204 More than a year and one-half after this letter was penned,

198. Complaint at 2, 245–252, Medical Mut. of Ohio v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1:18-cv-716
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2018), ECF No. 1.
199. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 17–19; McCollum, supra note 185, at 946.
200. See Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Approve Co-Leads, Co-Liaisons, & Exec. Comm. at
6–22, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2018), ECF No. 34
(providing list of proposed attorneys with extensive experience in MDL litigation to fill the roles);
Marginal Entry Ord. Granting Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion to Approve Co-Leads, Co-Liaisons, &
Exec. Comm. at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2018),
ECF No. 37.
201. Carla K. Johnson & Geoff Mulvihill, Victims Gain a Voice to Help Guide Purdue Pharma
Bankruptcy, AP NEWS (Oct. 6, 2019), https://apnews.com/03c831fe7bd94f02b0fea51d2e9f81ed
[https://perma.cc/XDM7-QTM5].
202. Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk Losing Our
Support,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/
business/dealbook/blackrock-laurence-fink-letter.html [https://perma.cc/9Y6Y-CRZV].
203. Id.
204. Id.; Andrew Ross Sorkin, World’s Biggest Investor Tells C.E.O.s Purpose Is the
‘Animating
Force’
for
Profits,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
17,
2019),
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nearly two hundred chief executives issued a statement agreeing to support
“good jobs, a strong and sustainable economy, innovation, a healthy
environment and economic opportunity for all.”205 Several defendants in the
opioid litigation signed this statement (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Defendants’ signatures on the 2019 Business
Roundtable statement206

By self-admission, many companies agree they must support the public
good. More generally, there appears to be rising recognition of a

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/business/dealbook/blackrock-larry-fink-letter.html
[https://perma.cc/ZC64-SETB]. Some disagreed strongly with Fink, but the statement reverberated
throughout the business community. See Mark R. Kramer, The Backlash to Larry Fink’s Letter
Shows How Far Business Has to Go on Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-backlash-to-larry-finks-letter-shows-how-far-business-has-to-go-onsocial-responsibility [https://perma.cc/7WWP-PTH8] (“[H]aving a positive social impact is
increasingly central to good management and shareholder value.”).
205. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION 1 (Aug. 19,
2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BRT-StatementonthePurposeofaCorporation
July2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJC6-6MNB] (emphasis added); see David Gelles & David YaffeBellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceoscorporations.html [https://perma.cc/B2BE-3HSM] (discussing executives’ statement that
companies should focus not only on advancing the interests of shareholders, but also invest in their
employees, protect the environment, and foster diversity).
206. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 205, at 5, 8–10.
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corporation’s public duty.207 This duty seems particularly important in the
marketing of chemical substances people ingest in good faith reliance on
proper testing and evaluation by the pharmaceutical company.208 As the
Supreme Court has explained, American society imposes the “requirements
of foresight and vigilance on responsible corporate agents . . . who
voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose
services and products affect the health and well-being of the public . . . .”209
Those who argue corporations should only consider the “bottom line” tend
to use one of two arguments.
First, they argue corporations’ near-exclusive purpose is to pursue profits
for shareholders.210 However, it has come increasingly under question that
corporations possess solely the profit motive and need not consider the
interests of others (in fact, this view is rather novel in history).211 A strict

207. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 39 DUKE L.J. 201, 201 (1990) (discussing
the development of corporations and the nature of corporate activity); Peter Nobel, Social
Responsibility of Corporations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1255–59 (1999) (discussing
corporations’ obligations to the public); David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate
Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253, 255 (2009) (“[C]orporations should be made to serve the interests
of society generally . . . .”); Joseph L. Bower & Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate
Leadership, HARV. BUS. REV. (May–June 2017), at 50, 58 (“Corporations must have ethical
standards to guide interactions with all their constituencies, including . . . society at large.”).
208. PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 644 (4th ed., 2014) (noting that
pharmaceutical companies have a responsibility to demonstrate a drug is safe and effective).
209. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975).
210. E.g., SANJAI BHAGAT & GLENN HUBBARD, SHOULD THE MODERN CORPORATION
MAXIMIZE SHAREHOLDER VALUE? 1 (Sept. 10, 2020) https://www.aei.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/Should-the-Modern-Corporation-Maximize-ShareholderValue.pdf?x91208 [https://perma.cc/542T-LFYC] (suggesting the success of long-term
shareholder value maximization relies on aligning shareholder wealth maximization with
stakeholder interests); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); Milton
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept.
13, 1970, at 32–33.
211. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 711–12 (2014) (“[M]odern
corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything
else, and many do not do so.”); Millon, supra note 207, at 203 (“[M]anagement ought to be able to
take the corporation’s public responsibilities into account, even if corporate profitability (and
shareholder welfare) would suffer as a result.”); Nobel, supra note 207, at 1255–59 (discussing
various perspectives of the corporation’s role in society); see also Steven L. Schwarcz,
Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2016)
(“[I]mposing a public governance duty to help align the firm’s interests with the public’s interests
would fit within corporate governance legal theory.”); Lynn S. Paine & Suraj Srinivasan, A Guide
to the Big Ideas and Debates in Corporate Governance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/10/a-guide-to-the-big-ideas-and-debates-in-corporate-governance
[https://perma.cc/5GAK-SPJ8].
Following the adoption of general incorporation statutes in many jurisdictions in the late
nineteenth century, those wishing to create a corporation no longer had to petition the state
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shareholder view does not comport with U.S. law, which explicitly
recognizes a public role of corporations.212 Further, it would be odd to say
that having a profit incentive to engage in particular conduct absolves
responsibility for engaging in that conduct. An employee who manages
corporate bank accounts has an incentive to steal money for personal gain.
But the employee is still ethically (and legally) responsible for stealing.
Similarly, the incentive to sell large quantities of opioids and to expand the
range of their therapeutic use does not justify this conduct. It may make it
understandable, but it does not provide ethical justification. Some may
distinguish the employee case by highlighting the unique profit-seeking role
of the corporation. That is, pharmaceutical companies have an incentive,
even a duty, to market aggressively. However, the outcome of the opioid
litigation will determine retroactively what conduct was profitable. This
sounds counterintuitive because the conduct has already occurred, but it is
true that if liability is high, the corporations misunderstood the incentives.
Does this make their conduct unethical? The predication of corporations’
ethical responsibility on profit becomes nonsensical when we are
establishing profit post hoc through tort liability. Imagine a light settlement
amount proving that, indeed, opioid manufacturers and distributors were
maximizing profit, and therefore their conduct was ethical. Further,
pharmaceutical companies possess the wealth to recruit large teams of

for a charter. Instead, they could form a corporation simply by filing the requisite forms
and paying the associated fees with the relevant government authorities. The ease with
which corporations could be formed thus reinforced the sense that incorporation was
largely a matter of private agreement among shareholders. However, the subsequent rise
of the giant railroad and manufacturing corporations and oil trusts of that era led to
widespread concern about these increasingly large concentrations of capital and their
impacts on society. . . .
By the 1930s an institutional view of the corporation moved into the mainstream and the
notion that corporations are influential actors in society with responsibilities not just to
shareholders, but also to employees, customers, and the general public gained credence
with some respected business leaders and academics. But the debate shifted again with the
emergence of neo-classical economics and a stagnant economy in the 1970s. A view of the
corporation as the property of shareholders once again took hold, and was soon developed
into a full-blown theory of corporate governance based on the idea that managers are the
agents of shareholders who own the corporation and expect it to be run for their benefit. . . .
Today, the debate continues but with a new sense of urgency. . . . While some academics
and many in the financial community continue to hold that the purpose of the corporation
is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders, and should be governed to that end, others
call for a more robust definition of corporate purpose.
Id.
212. See Millon, supra note 207, at 201 (discussing the view that corporate activities are
deliberatively responsive to public interest concerns); Nobel, supra note 207, at 1255–59
(comparing American shareholder approach with European stakeholder approach).
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lawyers who work diligently to shape the law and minimize liability,213
thereby rendering their conduct “ethical” under the profit-motive rationale.
Altogether, profits are a poor substitute for more traditional metrics of ethical
conduct. But any ethical metric besides financial incentives likely assigns
ethical responsibility to opioid companies —such metrics could include
harm to public health, harm to autonomy, and harm to considerations of
justice. The profit motive does not supply ethical justification for mass
harms, and opioid companies carry basic duties to public health.
Second, proponents of the shareholder-profit view might argue that
regulations should be outsourced to experts, such as government agencies,
thereby absolving opioid companies of responsibility and preempting tort
claims.214 Companion to this view is the argument that federal agencies that
regulate opioids—not pharmaceutical companies—made the key approval,
labeling, monitoring, and enforcement decisions.215 However, to place all
responsibility on a single federal agency is predicated on a simplistic view
of regulation that ignores the roles of other federal agencies, state law, state
agencies, and tort law—all of which serve important roles in public health.
The argument is also strained under the facts, which tend to show opioid
companies as bearing significant responsibility for the developing crisis.216
An agency-centric view ignores whether pharmaceutical companies
misrepresented a drug’s safety or efficacy,217 and whether they actually
complied with regulations. For example, in an action Purdue later admitted

213. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 220–
21 (2003) (emphasizing how corporations have access to valuable resources because they have the
greatest ability to pay).
214. See, e.g., Strange, supra note 184, at 537 (“[I]n the case of opioid drugs, Congress and the
various state legislatures have already enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme . . . controlling
the development, testing, production, manufacturing, distribution, labeling, advertising,
prescribing, sale, possession, use, misuse, abuse, theft, resale, and inter-state transportation of
opioid drugs.”).
215. See Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 351 (“Some courts, for instance, already have refused
to impose liability on drug manufacturers for these products, which were approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and then prescribed by doctors, often for labeled indications.”); see
also Bethany McLean, “We Didn’t Cause the Crisis”: David Sackler Pleads His Case on the
Opioid Epidemic, VANITY FAIR (June 19, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/06/davidsackler-pleads-his-case-on-the-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/MFH5-MZB5] (discussing the
FDA’s culpability in creating and fueling the opioid crisis).
216. See supra Section I.A (explaining pharmaceutical companies’ responsibility for the opioid
crisis).
217. See, e.g., Harriet et al., supra note 26 (explaining that Purdue Pharma’s marketing practices
could be considered deceptive for failing to test OxyContin’s safety and efficacy at eight hours and
for failing to change their label); Caitlin Esch, How One Sentence Helped Set Off the Opioid Crisis,
MARKETPLACE
(Dec.
13,
2017),
https://www.marketplace.org/2017/12/13/opioid
[https://perma.cc/AK3S-2YYZ] (describing the impact of adding the “delayed absorption”
sentence to the label and arguing fault lies with Purdue Pharma).
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was wrongful, the company distributed 15,000 OxyContin promotional
videos to physicians without review by FDA.218 Ultimately, no agency has
the resources to comprehensively police all pharmaceutical promotion.219 An
agency-centric view also ignores determined lobbying to hamper federal
agencies, as opioid companies did to the Drug Enforcement Agency through
lobbying Congress, according to a Washington Post exposé.220 Even the
Supreme Court is skeptical that federal regulatory decisions preempt state
tort liability for pharmaceuticals, absent clear evidence.221 And, ultimately,
placing responsibility on agencies for regulated products provides an odd
incentive for pharmaceutical companies to push for a regulator’s blessing for
immunity, then engage in misconduct. Pharmaceutical companies and
distributors are the closest to their products. In the legendary case United
States v. Dotterweich,222 the Supreme Court highlighted the sensibility of
applying strict liability to pharmaceutical companies, which stand “in
responsible relation to a public danger.”223 Companies that deal in
pharmaceuticals could be seen as an important set of eyes ensuring their
products are not harming the public.224 Pharmaceutical and other companies
have at times endorsed this type of thinking by supporting self-regulation
over government regulation, suggesting they are best equipped to tackle
regulatory issues.225 Indeed, some tort scholars have suggested a system of

218. Van Zee, supra note 11, at 224.
219. Id.; see also Carl Wiersum, No Longer Business as Usual: FDA Exceptionalism,
Commercial Speech, and the First Amendment, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 486, 487 (2018) (discussing
FDA’s limitations in protecting and promoting public health).
220. Scott Higham & Lenny Bernstein, The Drug Industry’s Triumph over the DEA, WASH.
POST (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/dea-drugindustry-congress/ [https://perma.cc/GN3S-DMWB] (“A handful of members of Congress, allied
with the nation’s major drug distributors, prevailed upon the DEA and the Justice Department to
agree to a more industry-friendly law, undermining efforts to stanch the flow of pain pills . . . . The
DEA had opposed the effort for years.”). See also Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 362 (“[S]cholars
have pointed out that litigation against powerful companies may also have the benefit of bringing
about regulatory change that legislators often cannot accomplish due to the influence of industry
lobbyists.”).
221. See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1672 (2019) (maintaining
a high standard of “clear evidence” in state failure-to-warn cases for pharmaceutical companies to
prove that FDA would not have approved a change); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 571 (2009)
(“[A]bsent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to Phenergan’s label,
we will not conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state
requirements.”).
222. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
223. Id. at 280–81.
224. See Wendy E. Parmet & Richard A. Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation, 21 ANN.
REV. PUB. HEALTH 437, 447 (2000) (“[P]roduct manufacturers are typically in a better position to
anticipate and internalize the costs of accidents than is the consumer who may be harmed.”).
225. See, e.g., Denis G. Arnold & James L. Oakley, The Politics and Strategy of Industry SelfRegulation: The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Principles for Ethical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
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predominant self-regulation supplemented by strict, full liability in tort.226
While such a scheme would present other issues,227 the point remains that
opioid companies hold a close view of their products and should be expected
to participate in avoiding mass harms caused by the items they sell.
Even if opioid companies possess a duty to the public’s health, it may
further be argued that such a duty does not extend to adversarial litigation,
in which the parties present their strongest one-sided arguments. However,
duties do not flicker on and off depending on the forum. If A has a legal or
ethical duty to B, for example in the context of a mother-daughter or
attorney-client relationship, the existence of a legal controversy does not
vitiate the duty. The mother could still be responsible for child support, and
an attorney remains bound by professional rules, such as the confidentiality
rule.228 In the same way, corporate duties remain in litigation. For instance,
if a defendant company received new adverse event reports showing that its
drug was more harmful than previously thought—to the point that it should
be removed from the market—it would be difficult for the company to argue
it held no ethical obligation to inform the public or the FDA about this
development,229 even if it was prejudicial to the company’s likelihood of
success in litigation. Drug companies are legally required to report certain
categories of adverse events,230 and the importance of pharmacovigilance to
public health is well-recognized.231

as a Deceptive Blocking Strategy, 38 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 505, 505–06 (2013) (“Selfregulation is one potential industry strategy for protecting patient well-being while minimizing the
inefficiencies that can arise with the introduction of new regulations.”).
226. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1263–81 (1998) (discussing an ex
post incentive-based approach in the cigarette context and why it is preferable to other regulatory
alternatives).
227. For example, where a plaintiff has used multiple brands of harmful products, responsibility
among manufacturers would have to be allocated. See Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of
Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405,
433 (1991) (detailing the different approaches a plaintiff suffering from cancer could take against
the manufacturers of the numerous brands of cigarettes he smoked).
228. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). While an attorney may
disclose some confidential information in a controversy with a client, id., the attorney remains
bound by professional ethics rules.
229. See Gardiner Harris & Eric Koli, Lucrative Drug, Danger Signals and the F.D.A., N.Y.
TIMES (June 10, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/10/business/lucrative-drug-dangersignals-and-the-fda.html [https://perma.cc/86D6-ZR2D] (describing Johnson & Johnson’s inaction
in the face of mounting evidence of harm caused by one of its drugs).
230. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1)(i) (2016) (“The applicant must report each adverse drug
experience that is both serious and unexpected, whether foreign or domestic, as soon as possible
but no later than 15 calendar days from initial receipt of the information by the applicant.”).
231. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD
PHARMACOVIGILANCE PRACTICES AND PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGIC ASSESSMENT 3 (2005),
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Similar arguments can be made for opioid distributors and pharmacies. In
toto, there is a strong link between corporate defendants and public health.
3. Tort Law as More than Private: Erosion of the
Public-Private Distinction
Although tort law is frequently referred to as “private law,”232 the last
century has seen the erosion of the public-private distinction. The publicprivate distinction is important because it has been used to delegitimize the
opioid litigation’s public health dimension by arguing the litigation offers a
fabricated connection between private lawsuits and a public crisis.233 The
conclusion may be that public health is an inappropriate goal of private
litigation234 or that relief should be limited to compensation only (no
deterrence).235 However, claims that the litigation is or should be purely
“private” do not stand up to scrutiny; indeed, the link to broad public health
is quite strong.
The first sign that arguments about the publicness and privateness of the
litigation have lost their principled basis is the prevalence of basic

https://www.fda.gov/media/71546/download [https://perma.cc/3HRJ-55XR] (“[P]ostmarketing
safety data collection and risk assessment based on observational data are critical . . . .”); see also
Jesse A. Berlin et al., Adverse Event Detection in Drug Development: Recommendations and
Obligations Beyond Phase 3, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1366, 1370 (2008) (providing
recommendations for addressing the challenges of postmarketing evaluation of drug safety).
232. John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640,
1640 (2012).
233. See Richards, supra note 192, at 455 (“[T]he question becomes whether governmental
entities, such as state attorneys general and local governments, are attempting to ‘obscure the
individual nature’ of injuries allegedly suffered by individuals in their jurisdictions and attributed
to opioid manufacturers by ‘focusing on the widespread use of the product or its potential to cause
harm.’” (internal citations omitted)); see also Strange, supra note 184, at 537 (discussing how
public-nuisance claims introduce courts and litigants into a policy-making decision that courts and
litigants are unfit to make); Peggy Little, Opioid Litigation Is Not the Cure for the Disease, LAW
& LIBERTY (Feb. 26, 2020), https://lawliberty.org/opioid-litigation-is-not-the-cure-for-the-disease
[https://perma.cc/P2TG-TA84] (expressing disdain for the public-nuisance theory of liability in
opioid liability as overstretching tort law and leading to such unintended consequences as
interference with physician judgment and reduced patient access to legal pain medications).
234. See, e.g., Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 357 (showing opioid companies commonly argue
that governmental entities, not private litigants, should enforce Controlled Substances Act and
related statutes); Strange, supra note 184, at 537 (“[Local governments’ public nuisance claims]
inject courts and litigants into what is, at bottom, a democratic policy-making decision that courts
and litigants are ill-suited to make.”); see also Spencer Bokat-Lindell, Opinion, Making Drug
Companies Pay for the Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/opinion/opioid-epidemic-companies.html
[https://perma.cc/V4V4-PANZ ] (arguing that the opioid epidemic is insoluble through litigation
because the opioid crisis is really a problem of depression and despair, and lawsuits do not address
the underlying problem).
235. Purcell, supra note 62, at 158; cf. Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 2140 (describing a
common but unwarranted belief that private lawyers pursue cases almost exclusively for
compensation).
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disagreements about where the litigation currently stands. Professor Nicolas
Terry sees the litigation as too private: in his words, the result “is more likely
to enrich the plaintiffs (politically) and their attorneys (financially) than
make a major impact.”236 He described this as an unavoidable consequence
of the structure of litigation, making it “best suited to well prescribed, narrow
claims” and “not a good tool for remedying mass social ills.”237 On the other
hand, Professor Rebecca Haffajee and Michael Abrams have framed the
opioid litigation as having “significant public health potential,” especially if
steps are taken to maximize public impact.238 Terry, Haffajee, and Abrams
see a public health component to the opioid litigation as beneficial, even if
Terry believes the litigation is too private.
On the other hand, former Alabama Attorney General Luther J. Strange
has criticized opioid lawsuits as “regulatory lawsuits,” encroaching on the
public realm of legislation and regulation.239 But he deemed monetary relief
as problematic, too, because “few corporations have the ability . . . to risk
trial when the plaintiff is an entire state asserting billions of dollars in
damages . . . .”240 Therefore, claims for high damages act as public coercion
that can force private parties into settlements with unfavorable terms.
Interestingly, this view implicitly cleanses the conduct at issue, aiming to
paint defendants as victims of an illegitimate court strategy. Similarly, David
Bernick, partner at Paul Weiss and counsel for part of the Sackler family, has
questioned “whether the solution to th[e] crisis really lies in the private
litigation system . . . . The issue is, is civil litigation the solution to a public
health crisis and I don’t think it is.”241 The Strange-Bernick account sees the
opioid litigation as too public.
Given that commentators disagree as to whether the litigation is
predominantly public or private, and whether this determination serves the
public good (however defined), there appears to be some indeterminacy to
these terms. If scholars cannot even agree if the litigation is public or private,
how are we even to begin such an analysis? Indeed, critical legal studies

236. Terry, supra note 56, at 638.
237. Id. at 667.
238. Haffajee & Abrams, supra note 11, at 734–35.
239. Strange, supra note 184, at 540–43.
240. Id. at 541 (citing In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–1300 (7th Cir.
1995)).
241. N.Y.U. School of Law, Panel 1: The Opioid Epidemic, YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iwbnd9EWVYc [https://perma.cc/VZF8-FEB5] (showing
David Bernick speaking as a part of a four-member panel discussing the opioid epidemic); see also
Richards, supra note 192, at 459 (questioning the propriety of public-health-oriented causes of
action in the opioid litigation).
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scholars have eroded the cleanness of a private-public separation.242
Professor Morton J. Horwitz has provided a thorough historical account
of the public-private distinction. According to his research, there was no
conceptualized private realm separate from the public realm until the
nineteenth century, when the emergence of the market as a centerpiece of
society led legal doctrine to reduce its interference in contractual affairs,
which were considered to be between private actors and therefore lacking a
cognizable state interest.243 During the same time period, scholars sought to
eliminate the tort law doctrine of punitive damages, which was thought to
mix public functions with private law.244 Judges thought that new limitations
on their discretion in private law served a greater (arguably public-minded)
desire to make law apolitical.245 Elevation of the public-private distinction
culminated in Lochner v. New York,246 notable for constitutionally protecting
private freedom of contract, thereby creating an awkward public-private
blend by giving private law constitutional imprimatur, whose contradiction
is self-evident. The decades-long pushback against the Lochner strand of
cases led not only to the famous battle between Franklin D. Roosevelt and
the Supreme Court, but to a paradigm shift in legal thinking among judges
and the academy. Horwitz noted,
For the next thirty years, the most brilliant and original legal thinkers
America has ever had devoted their energies to exposing the
conservative ideological foundations of the public/private
distinction. Culminating in the Legal Realist Movement of the
1920’s and 1930’s, judges such as Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo
and legal theorists such as Roscoe Pound, Walter Wheeler Cook,
Wesley Hohfeld, Robert Lee Hale, Arthur Corbin, Warren Seavey,
Morris Cohen, and Karl Llewelyn devoted themselves to attacking
the premises behind the public/private distinction. Paralleling
arguments then current in political economy, they ridiculed the
invisible-hand premise behind any assumption that private law could

242. Some scholars believe there is still some utility to using the terms “public” and “private”
to describe particular features of lawyering, even though the distinction, as used, is frequently
problematic. See Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 2137 (“[The] claim that the private attorney general
mixes aspects of public and private lawyering rests upon an assumption that there are, at least, these
two pure forms of lawyering.”).
243. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423, 1424–25 (1982) (describing the evolution of public and private legal realms).
244. See id. at 1425 (“Several states abolished punitive damages on the grounds that combining
public and private law functions was an unhealthy and dangerous business.”).
245. See id. (“By creating a neutral and apolitical system of legal doctrine and legal reasoning
free from what was thought to be the dangerous and unstable redistributive tendencies of
democratic politics, legal thinkers hoped to temper the problem of ‘tyranny of the majority.’”).
246. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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be neutral and apolitical. All law was coercive and had distributive
consequences, they argued.247
The Supreme Court took these criticisms to heart, evident in its 1948
decision Shelley v. Kraemer,248 which, in the context of a racially restrictive
covenant, held that a state court’s enforcement constitutes state action for
analysis of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.249 That is, even “private” contracting requires
public enforcement.250
Whether or not one finds it persuasive that contract law is largely public,
tort law is even more so.251 Tort is adjudicated by public actors—a judge, a
jury, perhaps some special masters, all within a courthouse. The elements of
committing a tort are determined by government—in modern times,
legislatures, and occasionally judges through the common law. The
standards of conduct set in tort law benefit the public. And tort suits have
inter-case effects; for example, tort law’s treatment of a water polluter may
cause the air polluter to take precautions.252 In these ways, tort law clearly
benefits both public and private.253
In the same vein, Professor William Rubenstein famously compared
lawyering to sex.254 Just as sexual orientation is more than homosexual and

247. Horwitz, supra note 243, at 1426 (citations omitted).
248. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
249. Id. at 20.
250. Scholarly arguments against the public-private distinction also draw on the prevailing
notion that corporations became so powerful during the 1920s that the distinction became blurred.
See Horwitz, supra note 243, at 1428 (“The attack on the public/private distinction was the result
of a widespread perception that so-called private institutions were acquiring coercive power that
had formerly been reserved to governments.”). Therefore, the public-private distinction was being
eroded on multiple fronts.
251. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
918 (2010) (“[T]ort law is in many ways public. It sets generally applicable standards of conduct.
It is developed and applied by officials who may have in mind various policy concerns as they
render judgments in particular cases. And its operation can advance or interfere with the operation
of other public institutions.”).
252. See Popper, supra note 160, at 183–84 (arguing deterrence extends to similarly situated
entities).
253. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 184 (1997).
Although various efforts have been made to draw principled distinctions between private
and public litigation in terms of objectives or remedies, such distinctions break down both
as a historical matter and in modern litigation practice. As Harold Krent has described, the
use of private litigation to supplement government law enforcement efforts dates from the
eighteenth century in both the United States and England. Today, civil fines and punitive
damages blur the line between compensation to victims and the punishment of wrongdoers.
Id. (citations omitted).
254. Rubenstein, supra note 190, at 2132.
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heterosexual, so is lawyering more than public and private.255
Applying these criticisms of the public-private distinction to the opioid
litigation, we can derive two insights. First, we must be cautious applying
the terms public and private in discussing the opioid litigation, in particular
using either term to disparage the litigation, as the terms are vague and have
limited utility. Instead, critiques should be directly levied at specific aspects
of the litigation and the disadvantages of those aspects. Second, the opioid
litigation has a quintessentially public function, inseparable from the
underlying causes of action, state statutes, state tort machinery, and federal
statutes that allow these claims in court. The circumstances of the opioid
litigation appear to establish that public health must be considered. A failure
to consider public health would be the greatest failure of a legal mechanism
that exists to benefit the public and serve the administration of justice.
B. Article III Implications of the Opioid Litigation
Article III of the Constitution, at first glance, may appear to present
problems for the opioid litigation. Several critics have voiced concerns that
opioid lawsuits exceed the proper authority and expertise of courts.256
However, this section will defend the broader public-health goals of the
opioid litigation.
One notable subject of attack has been the public-nuisance cause of action,
which allows redress for injuries to public health. For example, Professor
Michelle Richards has asserted that courts “must examine whether a public
nuisance claim is the most appropriate vehicle for remedying what is really
a public policy problem.”257 Attorney Luther Strange has used his critique of
public nuisance to launch a broader attack against the opioid litigation,
criticizing state pursuit of “regulatory lawsuits,” which may “regulate” and
“tax” defendants through settlement provisions without the legislature’s

255. Id. (“Lawyering . . . is like sex. There are not just two pure forms—the private attorney on
the one hand and the government attorney on the other—but rather an array of mixes of the public
and private.”); see Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft,
Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 16 (2000) (describing the blend of public and private lawyering in government litigation).
256. See JOSHUA K. PAYNE & JESS R. NIX, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, WAKING
THE LITIGATION MONSTER: THE MISUSE OF PUBLIC NUISANCE 22 (2019) (explaining that expert
agencies are qualified to make public-policy decisions in their areas of expertise, while judges are
limited in their knowledge and confined by the evidentiary record); Strange, supra note 184, at 547
(“The issues raised by the opioid litigation . . . [require] expertise beyond the purview of the
judiciary.”); cf. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Reforming Public Interest Tort Law to
Redress Public Health Epidemics, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 331, 346–47 (2011) (identifying
other scholars’ claims that the expansion of public nuisance threatens democracy, but arguing case
studies “suggest the opposite conclusion”).
257. Richards, supra note 192, at 455. See also Strange, supra note 184, at 537 (attacking
public-nuisance claims because they improperly force “democratic policy-making decision[s]” into
the courtroom).
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consent.258 In this way, litigation can lead to “higher requirements than those
established by the legislature or the agencies vested with responsibility for
regulating . . . .”259 At the core, Richards and Strange seem to argue that
courts exist to offer humble compensation to injured plaintiffs, not to violate
the separation of powers by serving public policy objectives.
Under existing law, Article III provides for the “proper—and properly
limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”260 Article III’s “case” or
“controversy” requirement has been interpreted to require that federal courts
hear cases capable of resolution by the judiciary, consistent with the
separation of powers.261 Modern Article III jurisprudence largely centers
around standing, i.e., requiring that plaintiffs possess a concrete injury
caused by defendants that is redressable by a favorable court decision.262
Standing requirements generally favor the litigation of concrete harms to
individuals, rather than more generalized harms,263 and injuries that are
actual or imminent, rather than those which are abstract and in the future.264
Given that the opioid crisis and the larger addiction crisis pose a threat to all
Americans, some skeptics believe they belong in the realm of legislation
rather than adjudication.265 In addition, courts may lack the expertise to
resolve important policy questions implicating multiple competing

258. Strange, supra note 184, at 543. See also Rustad & Koenig, supra note 256, at 346 (noting
that public-nuisance torts can be criticized as “back-door regulation”).
259. Strange, supra note 184, at 538. See also Purcell, supra note 62, at 169 (“[S]tate attorneys
general should refrain from establishing new regulatory regimes in order to avoid raising
constitutional concerns and to keep the focus of the negotiations on maximizing financial resource
allocations.”).
260. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975)).
261. Id. at 752; see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1990) (“[T]he doctrine
of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial
process.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
262. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
263. Id. at 575; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175–77 (1974).
264. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983); Lujan, 505 U.S. at 564.
265. See Richards, supra note 192, at 448 (“[C]ourts must make a determination
of . . . [numerous complex factors before] consider[ing] whether they should manage these types
of public policy concerns through public-nuisance litigation.”); Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 361–
62 (detailing advantages of legislation over litigation); Strange, supra note 184, at 537–38 (arguing
statutory and regulatory schemes are strongest public policy tools); Bernick, supra note 241
(offering a critique of private litigation); cf. Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts:
Litigation as a Legislative Strategy—Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 493, 498 (2002) (posing the new style of tort action as an “end-run” around the
legislative process). This critique implicitly invokes the political question doctrine. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function
of the separation of powers.”); see Political Questions, Public Rights, and Sovereign Immunity, 130
HARV. L. REV. 723, 723–24 (2016) (describing six categories of the political question doctrine,
including cases insusceptible to judicial standards, those requiring policy discretion beyond the
judicial pale, or those which imply disrespect toward a coordinate branch of government).
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interests.266
Therefore, Article III appears to lay out requirements for adjudication that
oppose a broad conception of public health across people and time. As
Professors Wendy Parmet and Dick Daynard have noted, standing and
similar justiciability doctrines, by zooming in on concrete harms to
individuals, seem to overlook the most important matters of public health.267
That is, large risks that threaten the entire U.S. population seem beyond the
pale of Article III. Put another way, courts address private harms, not public
ones.
In essence, these arguments rehash the private-public distinction
arguments discussed above268 but add a constitutional gloss about the proper
scope of an Article III court. These critiques can be rebutted from an Article
III perspective.
Before the most recent wave of opioid litigation, many plaintiffs brought
claims against opioid companies and received hundreds of millions of dollars
in settlements as well as settlement provisions restricting future marketing,
releasing confidential corporate information, and admitting fault.269 Since
these lawsuits, the opioid litigation has greatly expanded to include more and
different types of plaintiffs including almost every state and municipality in
the United States.270 But, fundamentally, many of the claims are based on the
same types of conduct, including deceptive marketing, failure to report
suspicious shipments, fraud, and so forth. Admittedly, there is an appearance
that Article III courts are allowing “litigation of a public-health crisis,” but
it is not surprising, in a crisis that generates mass death, that the plaintiffs are
broad in scope and the litigation is large and complex. Individual plaintiffs
have suffered concrete health injuries, and governments have incurred large
financial expenses, totaling around $57 million in 2019 alone.271 Far from an
abstract, future injury that would be barred for lack of Article III standing,
the opioid litigation is replete with death, despair, and financial burdens that
should never have been borne. And these harms are directly tied to
defendants’ conduct. For example, Purdue Pharmaceuticals, in a $634

266. See Strange, supra note 184, at 547 (suggesting that the political branches are better suited
to balance competing interests of harm reduction and economic development because these are
“complex policy judgments” (citations omitted)); PAYNE & NIX, supra note 256, at 32 (“[L]argescale societal challenges are better dealt with by the legislative and executive branches, which,
unlike courts, are uniquely capable of balancing all of the competing needs and interests in play.”).
267. Parmet & Daynard, supra note 224, at 450.
268. Supra Section III.A.3.
269. See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 46, at 2302–03 (detailing major government and classaction settlements against opioid companies from 2004 to 2017).
270. Supra Section III.A.2.
271. STODDARD DAVENPORT ET AL., SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NONMEDICAL OPIOID USE IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2019).

2021]

Public Health in the Opioid Litigation

61

million settlement with the DOJ in 2007, admitted that it misled physicians
and patients about OxyContin’s safety and misbranded it as abuseresistant.272
And yet, despite concrete injuries, the opioid litigation has an intangible
public feel to it. Does this fact delegitimize the litigation? As Parmet and
Daynard have written, “[T]he law’s individualist perspective is not often at
odds with the interests of the community. More often than not, the two are
intertwined.”273 Inevitably, as opioid claims have grown in number, the
litigation has become a public vindication of mass death. The opioid
litigation, then, stretches our notion of Article III by reminding us that the
sum of all Americans constitutes the public. The opioid litigation framed as
assemblage of “cases” and “controversies” helps alleviate Article III
concerns. Ultimately, the litigation cannot be said to be either private or
public; it is quite literally both.
Rather than step on legislative terrain, litigants bringing public nuisance
and other public-minded rights of action may actually be exercising
legislative will. Most of the causes of action at play in the opioid litigation
involve statutory violations. For example, Indiana’s statute for public
nuisance states:
Sec. 6.
Whatever is:
(1) injurious to health;
(2) indecent;
(3) offensive to the senses; or
(4) an obstruction to the free use of property;
so as essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property, is a nuisance, and the subject of an action.274
So, when the Indiana attorney general asserted in a complaint that three
opioid companies violated a public right to be “free from injury to the public
health” by creating a public nuisance through tortiously disseminating
opioids they knew were harmful,275 it was carrying out Indiana’s legislative
policy. The improper sale and distribution of opioids seem to fit the statutory
language like a glove, even if this approach to public nuisance is
innovative.276 Filing lawsuits as set by legislative policy hardly raises

272. Haffajee & Mello, supra note 46, at 2303.
273. Parmet & Daynard, supra note 224, at 451.
274. IND. CODE § 32-30-6-6 (2017).
275. Complaint at 207–08, Indiana v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. 49D07-1910-PL-044323 (Ind.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 22, 2019), https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/INAG/2019/10/22/
file_attachments/1309313/Distributors%20Complaint%20-%20REDACTED.PDF
[https://perma.cc/2WCX-GGZD]. 870-872
276. The counterargument is that public-nuisance lawsuits should be confined to historical
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separation of powers concerns. Indeed, there may be inherent value in
allowing injured people and governments to identify their own injuries and
seek vindication in court, as opposed to an ex-ante regulatory approach.277
Although some public-health remedies may require judges to resolve
public-health-related questions, courts can promote public health without
implicating policy-making expertise. Judges and other decision makers have
numerous options for how to handle claims within mass tort litigation—
whether to dismiss certain claims, which ones to adjudicate, how to facilitate
settlement, whether to recommend remand, whether to disaggregate, and so
forth. Therefore, many of the decisions judges can make, though intertwined
with public health, are fully within their Article III authority. This paper will
argue later that the best option to resolve the opioid litigation in a manner
consistent with public health is mass disaggregation of claims outside the
MDL.278 This recommendation is clearly consistent with Article III.
That said, resolution of the opioid litigation may implicate some policy
considerations. Most clearly, judgments and settlements may restrict
defendants’ future conduct. But some policy consideration is well within
judges’ historical bounds. Judicial policy discretion is most obvious in the
common law. Despite post-Erie279 skepticism of federal common law,280
state and even federal common law retain an important presence today.281
Common law may invalidate contracts on public policy grounds, find

traditions. Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77
TEMPLE L. REV. 825, 870–72 (2004); Ausness, supra note 193, at 568–69 (explaining cases where
courts declined to expand public-nuisance lawsuits to broad-based public-health concerns such as
firearms or lead paint). However, many courts have accepted modern public-nuisance claims for
products causing large harms. Id. at 569 (noting an Indiana court’s holding that scope of publicnuisance claim included gun manufacturers’ and distributors’ marketing practices). Indiana’s
public-nuisance statute, cited above, was last updated in 2017, see IND. CODE § 32-30-6-6 (2017),
and so it is not entirely clear why public-nuisance law should be limited to a particular historical
account. Indeed, tort law was previously, in some regards, more encompassing than it is today, with
strict liability as the default, see Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV.
465, 481 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)), and
so perhaps these claims would have fallen under traditional common-law liability. Given the
modern distaste for common law, it seems state statutes fitting the conduct in question are proper
sources of claims.
277. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 381 (2007)
(“[T]here are strong arguments that can be made for decentralized enforcement . . . .”).
278. Infra Section IV.B.1; see Aaron, supra note 1 (referencing the companion piece to this
paper, forthcoming in 2022, which will further discuss strategies to improve public-health
litigation).
279. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
280. See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the
Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 755 (2013) (“[T]he creation of federal common law
remains discouraged, thanks to Erie’s continuing vitality . . . .”).
281. For a discussion of the continuing importance of federal common law, see Curtis A.
Bradley et al., SOSA, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120
HARV. L. REV. 869, 878–79 (2007).
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implied procedural rights in contracts,282 immunize federal contractors from
state tort law,283 alter the scope of informed consent in medical care,284
change which claims surpass various legal hurdles such as a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss,285 and decide many other issues of importance. Within statutory
and constitutional bounds, judges retain some residual discretion, which is
probably important to use when adjudicating cases around mass death.
Historically, judicial oversight of deterrence and accountability has solid
footing. In the early-to-mid-1800s, tort law was conceived mainly to benefit
victims through compensation.286 Consistent with the goal of compensation,
tort law held tortfeasors strictly liable, and the character of the defendant’s
act had little import.287 However, the late 1800s saw a broad move toward
negligence,288 and courts became more concerned with the desirability of
defendants’ conduct.289 By the 1920s, the role of deterrence in tort law was
solidified.290 This change catalyzed a new public role for tort law, grounded
in deterring misconduct,291 even in litigation between private parties.292
Deterrence is an inevitable question for judges adjudicating tort disputes.
While it may seem discretion can be avoided by providing humble
compensation, this minimalistic view is difficult to square with the insight

282. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 589
(2000) (“Courts have applied due process and fairness requirements in two areas of contract law:
cases involving private associations’ interference with members’ economic interests, and
employment cases involving wrongful termination.” (citations omitted)).
283. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (concluding that certain
matters concerning “uniquely federal interests” fall within federal control and that state law is
preempted by federal common law in these cases (citations omitted)).
284. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding that
physicians must disclose any personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, including fiduciary
interests, as a prerequisite to informed consent).
285. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (dismissing plaintiffs’ action
because the claim to relief was facially implausible under the heightened pleading standard for
factual allegations); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (ruling allegations
consisting of “mere conclusory statements” cannot sufficiently withstand a motion to dismiss).
286. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 517 (2003)
(explaining how tort actions typically empowered individuals to seek personal, monetary redress).
287. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 85
(1977) (“[V]irtually all injuries were still conceived of as nuisances, thereby invoking a standard
of strict liability which tended to ignore the specific character of the defendant’s act.”).
288. See id. (“By the time of the Civil War . . . many types of injuries had been reclassified
under a ‘negligence’ heading . . . .”).
289. Goldberg, supra note 286, at 523–24.
290. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2001) (stating that one of the common “purposes” of tort law
is deterrence).
291. See Goldberg, supra note 286, at 524 (“[T]ort had transformed itself from private to
‘public’ law, whereby it functioned to achieve collective, not corrective, justice.”).
292. See Issacharoff, supra note 277, at 382 (“[P]rivate enforcement is so central to our system
of ex post accountability that the idea that a sufficient level of state or federal regulation could
effectively displace private litigation is almost inconceivable.”).

64

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 53

that setting the compensation amount heavily influences the deterrence
amount. More generally, tort law discourages certain types of conduct by
setting social standards.293 Legal standards, mens rea requirements, available
defenses, compensatory damages, punitive damages, the threat of release of
documents, and other doctrinal features of tort law inevitably affect the
future conduct of defendants. Imposing on defendants the full cost of the
opioid epidemic, for example, could be framed as compensatory, but would
doubtless affect future behavior. The only way to avoid affecting defendants’
conduct is to greatly constrain compensatory relief and offer no other relief,
which would allow defendants to continue their conduct without restraint.
However, this option is still making a policy choice: that of minimal relief.
And any set of relief provided will affect public health.294 As critics have
admitted, mass tort cases have “an enormous impact on public policy.”295
Rather than pretend tort law does not affect future conduct, courts and judges
who have experience adjudicating tort cases should pursue appropriate relief
and properly consider the impact of this relief on public health. Deficits in
knowledge should be supplemented with experts, special masters, and indepth study.
C. Litigation Is an Important Public Health Tool.
The prior sections aimed to demonstrate that public health must be
represented in the opioid litigation, and that this representation is consistent
with Article III. This Section will argue that, although some legal scholars
have criticized litigation as an ill-suited venue for promoting public health,296
litigation serves important public-health roles despite its limitations.
Dr. Thomas Frieden wrote that one of the key roles of government in
public health is to “implement societal interventions when individuals cannot
efficiently or effectively protect their own health . . . .”297 In 2017, opioids
were involved in more than forty-seven thousand overdose deaths in the
United States.298 In the same year, more than eleven million people misused
prescription opioids—totaling 4.1 percent of Americans twelve or older.299

293. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 251, at 918 (“[Tort law] sets generally applicable
standards of conduct.”).
294. See Galligan, Jr., supra note 290, at 1022 (“[A]ll tort suits might be viewed as public tort
suits because they affect the broader public.”).
295. Richards, supra note 192, at 459.
296. See, e.g., id. at 407 (arguing that although litigation frequently addresses public-health
concerns, whether litigation actually improves public health is unclear); see also Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 256, at 346–47 (highlighting Professor Goldberg’s claim that tort principles have been
stretched beyond their capacity in the name of social justice); Terry, supra note 56, at 638–39
(asserting that litigation likely cannot solve issues surrounding pharmaceutical misconduct).
297. Frieden, supra note 95, at 1752.
298. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 59, at 7.
299. Id. at 18.
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With these numbers, it appears individuals are unable to protect themselves
from opioid addiction.
In 2013, Dr. John Millar coined the term “corporate determinants of
health,” acknowledging that corporations had such a large impact on
Americans’ health that a new phrase was needed.300 The corporate
determinants of health are a useful concept to describe dynamics at play in
junk food, cigarettes, e-cigarettes, alcohol, guns, and opioids. These and
other social determinants of health are increasingly the drivers of disease in
the United States301 as well as health inequity.302 Lack of systemic attention
to the social determinants has arguably led to recent declines in American
life expectancy.303

300. John S. Millar, The Corporate Determinants of Health: How Big Business Affects Our
Health, and the Need for Government Action!, 104 CAN. J. PUB. HEALTH e327, e327 (2013). See
also Ilona Kickbusch et al., The Commercial Determinants of Health, 4 LANCET e895, e895 (2016).
Corporate influence is exerted through four channels: marketing, which enhances the
desirability and acceptability of unhealthy commodities; lobbying, which can impede
policy barriers such as plain packaging and minimum drinking ages; corporate social
responsibility strategies, which can deflect attention and whitewash tarnished reputations;
and extensive supply chains, which amplify company influence around the globe.
Id. See also Gerard Hastings, Why Corporate Power Is a Public Health Priority, 345 BRIT. MED.
J. e5124, e5126 (2012) https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.e5124 [https://perma.cc/HD7T-KBY9 ]
(“[F]ocus on the social determinants of ill health needs to be matched with an equal concern for the
commercial determinants of ill health.”); Ilona Kickbusch, Editorial, Addressing the Interface of
the Political and Commercial Determinants of Health, 27 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L 427, 427
(2012) (illustrating that many challenges arise when health issues are negotiated against political
and economic interests).
301. See Scott Burris, From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A Public
Health Law Research Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2011) (“Health care is a huge
part of the American economy and undeniably a public good, but the stakes are too high for the
public—and health law scholars—to continue neglecting the robust social structures that are
shaping America’s well-being.”).
302. See Michelle L. Frisco et al., Would the Elimination of Obesity and Smoking Reduce U.S.
Racial/Ethnic/Nativity Disparities in Total and Healthy Life Expectancy?, 7 SSM—POPULATION
HEALTH 1, 1 (Apr. 2019) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2019.100374 [https://perma.cc/S9823BHX] (“Obesity and smoking are the two leading causes of preventable death and disability in the
United States. Both of these health risks are socially patterned in ways that likely produce
racial/ethnic/nativity disparities in total and healthy life expectancy.”); see also Gopal K. Singh et
al., Social Determinants of Health in the United States: Addressing Major Health Inequality Trends
for the Nation, 1935–2016, 6 INT’L J. MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH & AIDS 139, 139 (2017)
(“Marked disparities in various health outcomes indicate the underlying significance of social
determinants in disease prevention and health promotion and necessitate systematic and continued
monitoring of health inequalities according to social factors.”); BRENNAN RAMIREZ ET AL., CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PROMOTING HEALTH EQUITY: A RESOURCE TO HELP
COMMUNITIES
ADDRESS
SOCIAL
DETERMINANTS
OF
HEALTH
4
(2008),
https://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dch/programs/healthycommunitiesprogram/tools/pdf/SDOHworkbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWB9-8CCG] (“The link between social determinants of health,
including social, economic, and environmental conditions, and health outcomes is widely
recognized in the public health literature.”).
303. See Steven H. Woolf & Heidi Schoomaker, Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates in the
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However, the corporate determinants of health are particularly difficult to
address. Part of the modern corporate enterprise is protecting a free market
for selling one’s products; to this end, corporations engage in lobbying,
philanthropy, and economic influence.304 Compared with this concerted
economic interest,305 public health is a collective good and therefore a
collective action problem.306 That is, everyone benefits from public health,307
but few have a strong individual incentive to support it. Although rational
humans might work together to solve diffuse collective action problems, they
often fail to do so.308
And while an apparent crisis may awaken the public to an unaddressed
problem, public health is complex. Public-health problems are often
unidentifiable at the individual level but clear on the population level, hence
the accelerating use of epidemiology in public health.309 For example,
epidemiology was critical to the identification of lead as harming children’s
brains.310 In addition, public-health problems may present complex chains of
causation; in the words of public health scholar Dr. Sandro Galea, “[A]n
understanding of health requires an understanding of the complex causal
architecture that creates health in the first place and structured thinking about
how we can grapple with these complex causes to improv[e] health.”311
When the problem itself requires complex data analysis and chains of
causation, it is no surprise that corporations selling harmful products may
conduct their business for decades before society reckons with the resultant

United States, 1959–2017, 322 JAMA 1996, 2009–11 (2019) (explaining that fatal drug overdoses,
among other issues such as liver disease and suicide, accounted for a decline in life expectancy in
the late 1990s).
304. Kickbusch et al., supra note 300, at e895; see also Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 362
(noting influence of corporate lobbying). Corporate wealth has also been used to control the
narrative through public relations and marketing. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 213, at 219–
21 (“[C]orporations are—in part because of market processes—profoundly effective at uncovering
and exploiting the most efficient and reliable means of influencing people and institutions . . . .”).
Psychological phenomena are also likely at play. See Gil Siegal et al., An Account of Collective
Actions in Public Health, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1583, 1586 (2009) (“[B]ehavioral economics
seeks to describe, predict, and sometimes direct people’s choices in a predetermined direction on
the basis of [social norms].”).
305. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 213, at 220 (“[Corporations] enjoy a common single
interest and thus an advantage in the competition to influence.”).
306. See Wiley, supra note 9, at 215 (explaining that public health is a shared value and
collective interest).
307. See Frieden, supra note 95, at 1753 (“Everyone benefits when people are healthier.”).
308. See Siegal et al., supra note 304, at 1586 (“[A]lthough rational individuals would choose
to work together to create and maintain public goods, they often fail to do so and collective action
problems persist.”).
309. Wiley, supra note 9, at 261–62.
310. Id. at 243–44.
311. Sandro Galea & Roger D. Vaughan, Making the Invisible Causes of Population Health
Visible: A Public Health of Consequence, August 2018, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 985, 985 (2018).
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damage.
The collective action lens helps us understand why litigation has become
a dominant force in public-health regulation. Presidents of both parties have
met little resistance as they deliberately hampered the administrative state,
which facilitated the sale of risky products.312 Ex-post litigation has emerged
as a natural response to resulting public-health harms.313 While some
commentators have suggested health-harming products should be managed
ex ante,314 appropriate regulation is often not present or deliberately
undermined, and it would be counterproductive to avoid litigation once exante regulation has failed.315 Even Judge Polster recognized litigation may
be an important ex-post backstop: “The federal court is probably the least
likely branch of government to try and tackle this, but candidly, the other
branches of government, federal and state, have punted. So it’s here.”316
Litigation surrounding other public-health crises, such as obesity, impure
water, and guns, has served important public-health gains even when
unsuccessful on the merits.317
The public-health goals of the litigation will be discussed later in this
piece318 and in the companion article.319 Ultimately, the opioid litigation
presents a golden opportunity to change the way that pharmaceutical
companies market and sell addicting products. Other branches and levels of
government, too, could have intervened earlier. However, because of the
unique adjudicative function of courts, the litigation may examine in detail

312. See NAGAREDA, supra note 164, at 10.
Upon entering office in 1981, President Ronald Reagan famously declared that
“[g]overnment is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.” Less than
two decades later, President Bill Clinton observed that “[t]he era of big Government is
over.” Notwithstanding their considerable policy differences, both the Reagan and the
Clinton administrations embraced measures that called for close examination of the costs
and benefits of regulatory initiatives. Ambitious regulatory programs, in short, would be
harder to obtain through the ordinary channels of public legislation and administrative
regulation.
In such an environment, tort litigation . . . emerged as an alternative means to address the
human costs of risk-taking by product manufacturers.
Id.
313. Id.
314. Strange, supra note 184, at 537; see Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 361–62 (describing
various scholarly critiques of court-derived solutions to public-health issues); see also Oliver
Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1213 (1984) (emphasizing regulatory
agencies’ importance in markets where consumers are poorly organized or lack information).
315. See Haffajee & Abrams, supra note 11, at 734–35 (concluding litigation has potential to
redress failures of regulatory oversight); see also Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 362 (“Litigation,
in the end, may be a second-best but necessary effort to catalyze broader change.”).
316. Transcript of Proc., supra note 5, at 4.
317. Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 351–52.
318. Infra Section IV.B.
319. Aaron, supra note 1.
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past conduct with an eye to preventing recurrence. If done properly, the
litigation could address an important corporate determinant of health.
D. The Opioid Litigation Is Deeply Intertwined with Public Health.
The opioid litigation has surpassed adversarial disputes and become a
public forum to address a large crisis in our nation’s history.320 As the size
of the harm increases, so rises the public nature of the dispute. Plaintiffs do
include individuals harmed by prescription opioids. But they go beyond the
level of the individual, many of them representing entire territories, states,
cities, and tribes around the country. Collectively, almost every American is
represented.
All this said, the opioid litigation remains a dispute among parties, even
if the plaintiffs collectively represent the entire public. The opioid litigation
therefore represents a paradox in that it is both adversarial and public.
However, the paradox resolves if one accepts that litigation often has a public
function. The opioid MDL is a public reckoning with mass harm, and the
public’s health will be affected by the final result. Any failure to represent
public health creates profound problems of agency.
IV. PUBLIC HEALTH AS AN AGENCY PROBLEM
Much scholarship has elaborated on agency problems in mass tort
litigation—who should further the interests of whom, how far those interests
should be furthered, and how incentives should be structured.321 However,
these critiques have not been extended to public health.
Public health is a superseding agency problem. Law already contains
agency problems between lawyer and client.322 Therefore, public-health law,
when it involves attorneys, presents a double agency problem. It is this
second level of agency—the representation of public health—that is the
predominant concern of this paper (Figure 7).

320. See supra Sections III.A–B (explaining the opioid litigation’s duty to support public health,
and that Article III of the Constitution does not restrict judges’ authority to oversee such litigation).
321. See sources cited supra note 19 and accompanying text (elaborating on agency and
procedural issues that harm plaintiffs in mass tort litigation).
322. See Scott Burris et al., Making the Case for Laws That Improve Health: A Framework for
Public Health Law Research, 88 MILBANK Q. 169, 175 (2010) (“Law is fundamentally a social
practice embedded in institutions and implemented by agents.”).
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Figure 7: Most scholarship discussing agency problems has focused on
misaligned incentives that prejudice plaintiffs. This paper seeks to
elaborate on a higher-level agency problem: that of public health.

This Part will discuss agency problems between public health and the
opioid litigation’s participants, who have generally favored quick,
unmaximized settlement. It will then discuss why fast settlement is
misaligned with public health.
A. Public Health Is Insufficiently Represented in the Opioid Litigation.
The litigation’s participants have supported rapid monetary settlement to
the exclusion of many important public-health goals.
1. Judge Daniel Aaron Polster
From the MDL’s inception, Judge Polster has dedicated himself to
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obtaining a settlement sans litigation.323 At a pretrial conference in January
2018, Judge Polster nixed the idea of litigation, hinting at the importance of
rapid resolution to help opioid victims:
Since we’re losing more than 50,000 of our citizens every year,
about 150 Americans are going to die today, just today, while we’re
meeting. . . . I don’t think anyone in the country is interested in a
whole lot of finger-pointing at this point, and I’m not either. People
aren’t interested in depositions, and discovery, and trials. People
aren’t interested in figuring out the answer to interesting legal
questions . . . . [M]y objective is to do something meaningful to
abate this crisis and to do it in 2018.324
Professor Howard Erichson, in an aptly named article, “MDL and the
Allure of Sidestepping Litigation,”325 described Judge Polster’s sentiments
as “understandable” but “stunning.”326 Later in 2018, Judge Polster urged the
same goals, stating that we need to quickly “come up with some amount of
money” and that “all this discovery and depositions and whatever, and a trial,
will accomplish zero.”327 The judge did oversee discovery, but has kept it
“shrouded in secrecy,”328 and has mainly concerned himself with fostering
settlement. On one occasion, he divided the parties into two rooms and
“shuttled between them” for ten hours.329
Judge Polster also certified the historic 23(b)(3) “negotiation class” (now
invalidated by the Sixth Circuit330) consisting of every municipal
government in the United States.331 The claims and issues were not certified
for trial, only for settlement, hence the name “negotiation class.”332 Although
Judge Polster correctly stated that he did not force plaintiffs or defendants to
use the negotiation class—in his words, it was only “an option”333—he
greatly privileged a monetary settlement. There is no parallel mechanism to

323. See Oliva, supra note 91, at 674–76 (noting Judge Polster’s statements about his
unwillingness to pursue a litigation track because it led to lengthy wait times for parties’ relief).
324. Transcript of Proc., supra note 5, at 4.
325. Howard M. Erichson, MDL and the Allure of Sidestepping Litigation, 53 GA. L. REV. 1287
(2019).
326. Id. at 1291.
327. Transcript of Status Conf. Proc. at 25, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No.
2804 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2018), ECF No. 854.
328. Oliva, supra note 91, at 698.
329. Sara Randazzo, More Money Demanded in Opioid Settlement Talks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18,
2019, 10:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-money-demanded-in-opioid-settlementtalks-11571441254?mod=rsswn [https://perma.cc/BZ5B-BX9C].
330. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664, 667 (6th Cir. 2020).
331. Memorandum Op. Certifying Negot. Class, supra note 88, at 15–16.
332. Id. at 32.
333. Id. at 4.
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establish transparency,334 substantive provisions regulating defendants’
future marketing, or accountability for defendants’ misconduct, among other
public-health goals.335 Constructing the negotiation class is like fixing all the
potholes in Road A (settlement), repaving it with asphalt, adding freshly
painted lines, and then asserting people can still take Road B if they wish.
Who would ever intentionally take Road B?336 Given that Judge Polster sees
settlement as the path to public health, it makes sense that settlement is his
goal. Yet one must ask if he has privileged monetary settlement too much.
Furthermore, most settlement provisions would cost defendants money.
Marketing restrictions, the release of documents, compliance programs, and
other public-health provisions are not free. Once the monetary amount is
already set, cities and counties may have to relinquish part of the settlement
amount to obtain these provisions. Not building them into the negotiation
class mechanism increases the likelihood that these goals will not be secured.
Admittedly, settlement discussions encompass private, local, state, and tribal
lawsuits, and to aggregate multiple types of relief may be asking too much
of a novel procedural mechanism. But one must ask whether it is wise to
pursue aggregate settlement without a plan for important public-health
provisions.337
The measures Judge Polster has taken to facilitate trials are comparatively
weak. Although he says he has pursued both settlement and litigation
“vigorously,”338 his under-prioritization of litigation left a weakness that
defendants arguably exploited. Five months into the MDL, Judge Polster
established a litigation track comprising three bellwether cases brought by
Ohio municipal plaintiffs.339 After bankruptcy stays, the remaining
bellwethers were pared down and settled for a total of $325 million accruing
to two Ohio counties.340 While the funds will surely be of use to the two
counties in mitigating the crisis, the settlement of the bellwethers does not

334. See Terry, supra note 56, at 659 (“The pressure to settle also comes at the cost of
transparency.”).
335. For a discussion of public-health goals, see Aaron, supra note 1.
336. Advantages of “Road B” are described infra in Section IV.B.
337. See infra Section IV.B (asserting that unmaximized rapid settlements can be detrimental
to public-health outcomes).
338. Op. & Ord. at 3, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Sept.
26, 2019), ECF No. 2676.
339. Case Mgmt. Ord. One, supra note 78, at 6.
340. See Sara Randazzo, Opioid-Addiction Litigation Heads to Complex Trial, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 20, 2019, 6:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/opioid-addiction-litigation-heads-forcomplex-trial-11571609814?mod=rsswn [https://perma.cc/K4ZB-2NXC] (explaining that while
some companies reached settlement agreements with Cuyahoga and Summit Counties, others such
as Purdue Pharma filed for bankruptcy before the trial was scheduled); see also Heisig, supra note
79 (“To date, nine companies have reached settlements with both counties worth more than $325
million.”).
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offer much to other plaintiffs, other than the knowledge that their claims, if
similar, may be viable. Each defendant, by offering a relatively small pot of
money, managed to avoid a large verdict and forestall the litigation. For
example, Johnson & Johnson paid $20.4 million to settle with the Ohio
counties,341 but its 2018 revenue was $81.6 billion (and its profits were $15.3
billion).342 From a financial standpoint, it appears desirable for defendants to
settle the bellwethers and delay the bulk of the MDL claims in order to
pressure plaintiffs and their attorneys—who desire money to alleviate the
opioid crisis and to compensate contingent-fee attorneys343—to settle for
less.
The next round of bellwethers has been scheduled: these include claims
by the same two Ohio counties against pharmacies,344 as well as claims by
the City of San Francisco and by the Cherokee Nation in Oklahoma.345 This
small number of cases can likely be settled to relieve litigation pressure on
defendants. And given this, it is unclear why Judge Polster believes that a
public-health-supporting settlement would be in reach without more
litigation pressure.346 The fall of the negotiation class has removed the
bargaining chip of global peace from municipal suits. If many more cases
were remanded, there would be a higher likelihood of defendants feeling
pressure to settle, and of some cases going to trial.
One caveat is that Judge Polster cannot himself transfer or remand cases
for trial.347 Remand is statutorily assigned to the MDL Panel.348 Therefore, it

341. Heisig, supra note 79.
342. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, ANNUAL REPORT 41 (2018), http://www.investor.jnj.com/annualmeeting-materials/2018-annual-report [https://perma.cc/B9Z3-QTAZ].
343. See Ausness, supra note 193, at 608 (“[T]he plaintiffs would start receiving their money
much sooner if they settled than if they took each case to trial.”).
344. See Eric Heisig, Federal Judge over Opioid Lawsuits Sets October 2020 Trial for
Cuyahoga, Summit Counties’ Claims Against Pharmacies, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2019/11/federal-judge-in-opioid-lawsuits-sets-october2020-trial-for-cuyahoga-summit-counties-claims-against-pharmacies.html
[https://perma.cc/B4TM-E6TW] (“[Judge Polster] will preside over a trial against CVS, Walgreens,
Rite Aid, Discount Drug Mart and HBC, which is part of Giant Eagle.”).
345. See Miller, supra note 80 (stating that lawsuits filed by the City of San Francisco and the
Cherokee Nation in Oklahoma would be heard in federal court following a recommendation by
Judge Polster).
346. See Howard M. Erichson, Settlement in the Absence of Anticipated Adjudication, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2017, 2023 (2017) (“The threat of legal compulsion to force a defendant to pay
damages or alter its conduct—that is, the threat of adjudication—is the only thing that gives
plaintiffs meaningful leverage in settlement.”).
347. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 20.132–33 (2004) (“[An MDL] court
has no independent authority to order section 1407 remand.”); see also Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28 (1998) (“The issue here is whether a district court
conducting such [MDL] ‘pretrial proceedings’ may invoke § 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to
itself for trial. We hold it has no such authority.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a))).
348. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
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is possible the MDL Panel played a role in nixing additional trials.
Nonetheless, Judge Polster has favored expeditious monetary settlement to
the detriment of public health.
2. MDLs
The strong bent toward settlement transcends Judge Polster; it is ingrained
into the MDL system itself. In fact, Judge Polster has expressed his belief
that he was chosen by the MDL Panel expressly because “[a]ddressing
settlement early and often is my standard operating procedure.”349 The strong
push to settle is one of the not-so-quiet secrets of the MDL world. The MDL
Panel is known to prefer judges who settle cases quickly.350And it has
leverage: MDL cases have been described as the “dessert” of judging, and
80 percent of judges who receive an MDL assignment would like another, as
they present interesting legal issues.351 Even beyond MDLs, judges enjoy
clearing their crowded dockets.352 Federal judges are tracked for their
efficiency: the “six-month report” is a judicial report card that tracks how
many disputes have lasted longer than three years.353 In addition, settlements
are unlikely to be successfully appealed,354 therefore sparing judges from an
embarrassing reversal. If there remains any doubt, the Manual for Complex
Litigation, a document intended to help federal judges resolve mass tort
cases,355 explicitly favors global settlement:
One of the values of multidistrict proceedings is that they bring
before a single judge all of the federal cases, parties, and counsel
comprising the litigation. They therefore afford a unique opportunity
for the negotiation of a global settlement. Few cases are remanded
for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the transferee court.
As a transferee judge, it is advisable to make the most of this
opportunity and facilitate the settlement of the federal and any
related state cases.356
It is instructive that the Manual for Complex Litigation seems to prioritize
efficiency, as opposed to other goals such as justice or public health.357

349. Op. & Ord., supra note 338, at 3.
350. See BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 30 (“As one judge remarked . . . ‘I am
doing a good job in my MDL so people will come back to me. Some judges are notoriously slow.
This leads to repeat players. You need to assign cases to judges who understand how to move this
along.’”).
351. Id.
352. See Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 45–46 (explaining that settlement declutters judges’
crowded dockets).
353. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 29.
354. See Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 46 (“A judge faces virtually no prospect of reversal
for approving a settlement, whereas a decision rejecting a settlement might well be appealed.”).
355. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH, Introduction (2004).
356. Id. § 20.132.
357. Id. § 20.133.
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As a result of these pressures and incentives, MDLs have developed a
“settlement culture”: 92 percent of MDL judges in settling cases took steps
to further the deal, and only 3 percent of cases are remanded to the courts of
origin, even though MDLs exist ostensibly for pretrial proceedings.358 While
it is understandable that the MDL Panel values efficiency, such a strong
desire for efficient settlement may prejudice public-health goals.359 Article
III courts may exist to resolve disputes, but the ways they resolve disputes
raise concerns about misalignment with public health.
3. Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Private Attorneys
No doubt, it would be impossible for so many MDL cases to settle were
it not consistent with the wishes of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys.
Settling is the best method for plaintiffs’ attorneys to earn rapid returns on
their investments in the litigation (given contingent-fee arrangements),360
and for defendants’ attorneys to obtain global closure for their clients.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are notoriously unsupervised by their clients in MDL
cases, and generally they have control over the course of the litigation.361
These agency costs favor a “sweetheart” settlement, in which plaintiffs’
attorneys trade a low settlement amount for a high fee.362 Professor Burch
described such a sweetheart settlement in the MDL on Propulsid (Cisapride),
a gastric motility drug that was used for heartburn in children and was later
found to have caused heart arrhythmias and killed at least eighty people:363
[I]n litigation over the acid-reflux medicine Propulsid, only 37 of
6,012 plaintiffs (0.6%) recovered anything through the strict
settlement program. Their collective recoveries totaled no more than
$6.5 million. Yet, defendant Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay lead
lawyers more than $27 million in common-benefit attorneys’ fees.
In return, what was left of the fund (some $45 million) would go

358. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 24, 29, 119 (citations omitted).
359. See id. at 29 (explaining that the settlement culture of MDL practice promotes efficiency
as paramount importance that may outweigh fairness or other goals).
360. Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 17–18, 44; Ausness, supra note 193, at 608.
361. See Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict
Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985, 1986 (2011) (“Lead attorneys enjoy plenary and, in many
respects, exclusive control of the litigation.”); see also S. Todd Brown, Plaintiff Control and
Domination in Multidistrict Mass Torts, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 391, 394–95 (2013) (“[T]he quasiclass multidistrict tort model also strips plaintiffs of the means of protecting their own interests
from overreaching repeat players.”); cf. Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 3 (arguing the same for
class actions).
362. See Coffee, supra note 19, at 633 (“At its simplest, the classic form of opportunism in class
actions is the ‘sweetheart’ settlement, namely one in which the plaintiff’s attorney trades a high fee
award for a low recovery.”).
363. See Harris & Koli, supra note 229 (explaining that by the time the drug was pulled from
the market, there were eighty deaths reported to the federal government, and that children were
most at risk for cardiac problems and death caused by taking Propulsid).
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back to Johnson & Johnson. So, it appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers
profited, Johnson & Johnson paid the equivalent of a regulatory fine,
and most plaintiffs were left to puzzle over why they were left
empty-handed.364
Although one might hope judges select lead plaintiffs’ attorneys who do
not design settlements that harm their own clients, judges, in fact, may prefer
lawyers who rapidly resolve claims, at least from an incentive standpoint.
Indeed, the same lawyers tend to be appointed again and again to direct the
plaintiffs’ case in MDLs,365 leading to an ongoing cycle of plaintiff harm,
which Professor S. Todd Brown has dubbed “plaintiff control and
domination,”366 and Professor Burch has named MDL “monopolies.”367
It is an odd situation when adversarial litigation invokes cooperation
between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel, but it appears that MDLs
provide precisely the type of incentive for such teamwork to occur.368 The
concern here is that the status quo favors fast, unmaximized settlements that
cater to the interests of the attorneys. Such settlements are likely to neglect
plaintiffs’ interests and those of public health.
Not all MDLs end in collusive or weak settlements. However, in the
opioid context, expeditious monetary settlement has been the goal since the
opioid MDL’s inception, even evidenced by admission of the judge. This is
not to say these arguments apply to all lawyers participating in the litigation,
but many of the troubling incentives are present.
4. Government Attorneys
Government attorneys have arguably been the strongest proponents of a
pro-public-health outcome so far in the litigation369 (other than amici), but

364. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 2.
365. See id. at 77 (finding in MDL dataset that 63 percent of plaintiffs’ lead attorneys and 82
percent of defense firms are repeat players).
366. Brown, supra note 361, at 391.
367. Burch, MDL Monopolies, supra note 19, at 67.
368. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 63 (“The status quo consistently benefits
the same insiders: lead plaintiffs’ lawyers broker deals that increase their own common-benefit fees
and corporations end lawsuits.”); but see Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have
the “Haves” on Your Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 108 GEO. L.J.
73, 88 (2019) (“[A]lthough aggregation in the hands of repeat-player lawyers inevitably carries
risks, it also presents one-shotter plaintiffs with important opportunities to level the playing field
with repeat-player defendants.”).
369. See Catherine Thorbecke, State Attorneys General Call Purdue Pharma Settlement a “Slap
in the Face” for Victims of Opioid Crisis, ABC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2019, 4:23 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/state-attorneys-general-call-purdue-pharma-settlementslap/story?id=65546325 [https://perma.cc/W6JV-J2H5] (describing critiques from attorneys
general on low monetary settlement with Purdue Pharma); see also The States’ Coordinated
Opposition to the Debtors’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction of States’ Law Enforcement Actions
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not all of them have been, and the incentives at play deserve analysis. First,
to the extent that governments are outsourcing their litigation to private
attorneys,370 some of the same agency problems arise as for private attorneys.
In addition, attorneys general have grown more political in recent years.371
These dynamics played out in dramatic fashion in opioid settlement
discussions. In September 2019, Purdue offered to settle all its claims for
about $10 billion, including just $4.4 billion in cash.372 This amount of cash
is less than half what the Sackler family withdrew from Purdue and stashed
in trusts and offshore accounts over the last decade.373 While attorneys

Against the Sacklers at 9, Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Massachusetts, No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 4, 2019), ECF No. 41 (writing on behalf of a coalition of states).
The offer that Purdue describes does not include any admission of wrongdoing; it does not
require public disclosure of all the evidence; and does not enjoin the Sacklers from future
misconduct. . . . If the States accepted the offer, there would never be a trial to determine
the Sacklers’ liability for one of the greatest public health crises of our time. The 25
Attorneys General signing and joining this brief determined that the right way to meet their
responsibilities at the present time was to reject the offer and continue their actions to
enforce the law.
Id. (emphasis added).
370. See Karen Kidd, Attorney: Private Lawyers Hired by Local Governments Are the “Single
Greatest Threat to Attorneys General”, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://legalnewsline.com/stories/520833705-attorney-private-lawyers-hired-by-localgovernments-are-the-single-greatest-threat-to-attorneys-general [https://perma.cc/A4NM-5JZL]
(noting that governments are hiring private lawyers to handle opioid and other litigation); see also
Jan Hoffman, Opioid Settlement Offer Provokes Clash Between States and Cities, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
13,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/health/opioids-settlement.html
[https://perma.cc/HU4Y-XVBC] (pointing out that some private counsel hired by state
simultaneously represent cities and counties, creating appearance of conflicts of interest); Eric
Lipton, Lawyers Create Big Paydays by Coaxing Attorneys General to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/us/politics/lawyers-create-big-paydays-by-coaxingattorneys-general-to-sue-.html [https://perma.cc/TT58-8WF6] (describing how private attorneys
get hired by state attorneys general and work on contingency fees to support regulatory
enforcement).
371. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General,
and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2103–04 (2015) (“[A]lmost all
state attorneys general are elected politicians, and many seek higher office. Because they generally
are not long-term players before the courts, they are less likely to genuflect before them. They
would rather curry favor with those who might back their aspirations for higher elected office.”
(citation omitted)); see also Lemos & Young, supra note 163, at 45–46 (providing examples of
partisan public lawsuits by state governments); Paul Nolette, State Attorneys General Have Taken
Off as a Partisan Force in National Politics, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/23/state-attorneys-generalhave-taken-off-as-a-partisan-force-in-national-politics [https://perma.cc/UF36-KWLJ] (“Today,
almost every time there’s a major federal policy change, partisan groups of AGs will bring a
challenge—and often an opposing group of AGs will intervene to defend the administration.”).
372. Julia Lurie, The Purdue Settlement Is a Great Deal—for the Sacklers, MOTHER JONES
(Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/09/the-purdue-settlement-is-a-greatdeal-for-the-sacklers [https://perma.cc/ENF3-8WBM].
373. Jan Hoffman & Danny Hakim, Purdue Pharma Payments to Sackler Family Soared Amid
Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/16/health/sacklerspurdue-payments-opioids-.html [https://perma.cc/2QXY-T7NZ].
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general were split over the deal, there was substantial overlap between
attorneys general represented by private counsel and those supporting the
deal,374 suggesting a sweetheart settlement.375
The Purdue proposal was notable, too, for attorneys general being split
nearly down party lines, with Democratic attorneys general tending to refuse
the deal and Republican ones tending to accept it.376 The question arises why
they largely voted with their party, rather than on the merits of the agreement.
Perhaps obviously, they are attempting to curry political favor for reelection.
Opioid companies have spent large sums of money lobbying federal and state
government. According to one analysis, pharmaceutical companies and
associated groups spent $880 million over ten years on opioid-related
lobbying, compared to $4 million spent by those advocating to limit
opioids.377 Lobbying of attorneys general groups has ramped up during the
opioid litigation.378 The politicization of attorneys general implicitly
disfavors public health by reducing the importance of a strong and just
settlement, tilting some actors toward the interests of opioid companies.
Unfortunately, elections will not cure this agency problem, as attorneys
general may depend on contributions to be reelected. And voters generally
lack the expertise to appreciate the public-health value of a settlement.379
Not all government attorneys fall prey to such incentives, and many
government attorneys have looked beyond quick, low settlement offers.380
However, other government attorneys suffer from agency problems that
threaten to weaken the public-health impact of the opioid litigation.

374. Lurie, supra note 372.
375. A fair deal would have had more support among attorneys general without private
representation.
376. Lurie, supra note 372; Laura Strickler, At Least 20 States and D.C. Reject Settlement with
OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma, NBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2019, 11:22 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/least-16-states-reject-settlement-oxycontin-makerpurdue-pharma-n1052601 [https://perma.cc/P7JW-8GKJ].
377. Pharma Lobbying Held Deep Influence over Opioid Policies, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY
(Sept. 18, 2016), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/pharma-lobbying-held-deepinfluence-over-opioid-policies [https://perma.cc/6SXC-MFZX].
378. See Lurie, supra note 372 (“The AP recently noted Purdue’s historic support of Republican
Attorneys General Association: $680,000 to the group between 2014 and 2018, compared to
$210,000 to the group’s democratic counterpart.”).
379. See Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State
Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 521 (2012) (“Absent a fairly detailed and nuanced
understanding of the law and facts of each case, it may be impossible to determine whether each
settlement publicized by the attorney general signifies a meaningful victory for the represented
citizens.” (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1266–
86 (1995))).
380. See Thorbecke, supra note 369 (showing several state attorneys general critiquing quick,
low settlement offers).
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5. Special Masters
Judge Polster has commissioned three special masters, who were initially
suggested by attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants.381 Special masters serve
federal judges in resolving complex civil litigation, particularly with pretrial
issues and settlement negotiations.382 The opioid special masters have
numerous powers, including communicating with parties ex parte,
mediation, providing legal analysis of a party’s submission, setting
conference agendas, interpreting parties’ agreements, supervising the
implementation of and compliance with court orders, finding facts, and
issuing orders and rulings.383 It may seem important to appoint special
masters who will utilize these powers to pursue goals associated with the
litigation, including public health. However, because they are chosen by
counsel and the judge, there is an immediate suspicion they replicate the
same agency problems with public health. That is, these special masters were
likely hired for their knowledge about dispute resolution, not their alignment
with public health.
The first special master is David R. Cohen, a professional special master
and mediator who has served in at least seven prior MDLs.384 On the front
page of his website, he lists “Life Hacks for Judges,” defining life hack as a
“strategy or technique that makes some aspect of one’s life easier or more
efficient.”385 The first life hack describes a 300 percent increase in the use of
special masters by federal judges:
More and more judges are recognizing the valuable service and
attention Special Masters provide to the Court and the parties,
leading to more efficient, cost effective and faster case
resolution. . . . Because of heavy caseloads and judicial vacancies,
many Federal judges simply do not have sufficient time for full
oversight of complex cases. . . . Simply, judges increasingly
recognize they need good help. And, with expanding dockets, this
need is expected to increase.386
David Cohen is clearly appealing to the judicial desire for efficiency,
which is baked into the MDL process. Rapid resolution is the goal.

381. Appointment Ord., supra note 181, at 1.
382. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 347, at § 11.52 (outlining
the authority of special masters and their functions).
383. See Appointment Ord., supra note 181, at 2–5 (describing special masters’ duties, how
they may communicate with the parties and the court, and how their rulings are reviewed).
384. David R. Cohen Resume, DAVID R. COHEN, https://www.specialmaster.law/resume
[https://perma.cc/DV5E-46BL] (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
385. David
R.
Cohen:
Federal
Special
Master,
DAVID
R.
COHEN,
https://www.specialmaster.law [https://perma.cc/5KUA-6K22] (last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
386. 300% Increase in Use of Special Masters by Federal Judges, DAVID R. COHEN (emphasis
added),
https://www.specialmaster.law/2016/12/13/300-increase-in-use-of-special-masters-byfederal-judges [https://perma.cc/K2BJ-D35U] (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
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The second special master was Professor Francis McGovern,387 one of the
two inventors of the negotiation class, a settlement device. The third special
master is Cathy Yanni, an employee of JAMS,388 the largest private company
for alternative dispute resolution.389 The second sentence in her online bio is
“Since joining JAMS in 1998, she has settled thousands of cases.”390
Professor Elizabeth Burch described Cathy Yanni as one of a cadre of
insiders favored by MDL repeat players.391
All three special masters were appointed with consent of the judge and
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel, and so it is not surprising they possess a
similar pro-settlement bent.392 Special masters are compensated handsomely
for their settlement abilities: in the words of Professors Elizabeth Burch and
Margaret Williams, the “entire industry . . . thrives upon mass-tort
settlements.”393 In and of itself, the goal of rapid dispute resolution is not
problematic. The problem exists because rapid resolution through settlement
may be misaligned with public health. Without ensuring that other goals are
considered, there is a risk that public health—what should perhaps be the
most important goal of the opioid litigation—falls by the wayside.
B. Why Rapid Settlement Disserves Public Health
Rapid settlement generally disserves public health because it makes
important public-health goals harder to achieve—in the opioid litigation and
beyond.
1. The Opioid Litigation
From a process perspective, if one finds persuasive the agency problems
between the opioid litigation’s players and public health, then it is difficult

387. Sadly, he passed away in February 2020. Duke Law Mourns Francis McGovern,
Preeminent Expert in ADR, Resolving Mass Tort Claims, DUKE LAW (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://law.duke.edu/news/duke-law-mourns-francis-mcgovern-preeminent-expert-adr-resolvingmass-tort-claims/ [https://perma.cc/Z7JA-UPGR].
388. Cathy Yanni, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/yanni [https://perma.cc/A7QR-65XR]
(last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
389. About Us, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/about [https://perma.cc/C623-AEJ7] (last
visited Aug. 19, 2021).
390. JAMS, supra note 388.
391. See BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 145–46 (explaining that Cathy Yanni
has long been accepted by the elite group of repeat players involved in mass tort settlement and
complex multidistrict litigation).
392. See Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a
Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA ST. U. L. REV. 927, 939 (2002) (“[E]vidence
shows that a relatively few individuals gain the vast majority of the business of court-referred
mediation and contractual arbitration. These must be people acceptable to the parties who are repeat
players . . . .”).
393. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Judicial Adjuncts in Multidistrict
Litigation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2129, 2224 (2020).
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to understand why a private settlement agreement, largely orchestrated by
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys, would maximize public health. These
attorneys have incentives to create a deal beneficial to themselves. Who is to
guard the public health given the agency problems? Unlike a class action, in
which Rule 23(e) requires judges to ensure settlements are fair, reasonable,
and adequate, MDL settlements are private agreements, and plaintiffs may
withdraw their actions without court order under Rule 41(a).394 A private
deal is orchestrated largely outside the court’s influence, with few checks
and balances or opportunities for public participation.395 Judge Polster
retains some informal oversight over the negotiation process, but probably
could not disapprove a settlement,396 and even if he could,397 he and the larger
MDL apparatus mainly seek efficient resolution. This is not how a publichealth-affecting settlement should operate. The settlement process should be
transparent, participatory, and checked by public-health mechanisms.
More substantively, the litigation could pursue an imaginative array of
public-health goals beyond mere efficiency. The companion article to this
one offers a deeper dive into public-health goals,398 but I will highlight them
here. First and foremost, accountability of defendants should be prioritized.
Accountability is the application of sanctions when a standard of conduct is
breached.399 Accountability ensures that tort standards of conduct carry
weight in product markets.400 A failure to achieve accountability weakens
the rule of law.401 And given that pharmaceutical marketing is arguably
underregulated ex ante,402 ex-post litigation becomes the principal way of

394. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 105.
395. There is no adversarial hearing on the benefits and harms of a proposed MDL settlement.
Id. at 117.
396. Judge Polster would have had such authority over the Rule 23(b)(3) negotiation class, at
least with respect to participating municipalities. However, the negotiation class is now invalid. See
In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 976 F.3d 664, 667 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that certification
of negotiation class was impermissible).
397. In about half of MDLs, judges do “approve settlements,” but usually their involvement
pushes parties to settle, and the parties determine the terms. See BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra
note 19, at 104–05 (describing MDL settlement process).
398. See generally Aaron, supra note 1.
399. See James E. Swiss, Holding Agencies Accountable for Efficiency: Learning from Past
Failures, 15 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 75, 78 (1983) (“[Accountability] necessarily ha[s] three components:
(1) the setting of an initial standard; (2) the monitoring of governmental actors or activities against
that standard; and (3) the application of sanctions if the actors fall short of achieving the
standards.”).
400. Aaron, supra note 1.
401. Id.
402. See Lisa M. Schwartz & Steven Woloshin, Medical Marketing in the United States, 1997–
2016, 321 JAMA 80, 89 (2019) (detailing insufficient FDA regulatory oversight); see also Joshua
Weiss, Note, Medical Marketing in the United States: A Prescription for Reform, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 260, 263–65 (2010) (describing the impact aggressive marketing techniques have on
doctors’ prescribing habits).
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ensuring pharmaceutical companies comply. Achieving accountability
requires changing the incentives; substantial tort liability now
discourages future risky conduct.403 To prevent addiction epidemics from
continuing to repeat themselves,404 the misbehavior of corporate actors
requires accountability.
Second, rather than rush settlement, plaintiffs could build bargaining
power through trials and thereby seek more money for addiction treatment
and services (which also promotes accountability). Third, transparency is
fundamental. As Professor Jennifer Oliva wrote in her amicus brief, ensuring
public access to opioid documents is “an indispensable element of any
comprehensive strategy to ameliorate the country’s ongoing drug use and
overdose crisis and to prevent similar crises from occurring in the future.”405
Transparency would benefit research, prevention,406 and potentially
accountability of defendants, as released documents could bolster other tort
lawsuits and investigations into the misconduct of opioid company directors
and officers.407 Fourth, public-health provisions, obtained through settlement
or injunctive relief, could restrict defendants’ future marketing, curtail
lobbying expenditures and other corruptive corporate spending,408 and
prevent opioid companies from manipulating health-insurance markets.409

403. See Popper, supra note 160, at 181–82, 188 (“[D]amage awards modify future behavior
indirectly by providing disincentives for future conduct that is unduly risky.” (quoting Robert L.
Fischman, The Divides of Environment Law and the Problem of Harm in the Endangered Species
Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 685 (2008))).
404. The U.S. has suffered multiple opioid crises and multiple other addiction crises. Aaron,
supra note 1.
405. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of a Settlement Agreement Including Broad
Transparency Provisions in the Interest of Future Research at 18, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., MDL No. 2804 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2019), ECF No. 2593-1.
406. Id. at 1, 8.
407. Cf. Oliva, supra note 91, at 687 (noting that transparency can serve accountability
functions); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An Essay
on the Obama Administration, Google Government, and the Difficulties of Securing Effective
Governance, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 478 (2011) (“It is true that transparency facilitates
accountability . . . .”). In the words of then-President Barack Obama, “A democracy requires
accountability, and accountability requires transparency.” Freedom of Information Act:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 26,
2009).
408. See U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFS. COMM., FUELING AN EPIDEMIC:
EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL TIES BETWEEN OPIOID MANUFACTURERS AND THIRD PARTY
ADVOCACY GROUPS 1 (2018), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/REPORTFueling%20an%20Epidemic-Exposing%20the%20Financial%20Ties%20Between%20Opioid%
20Manufacturers%20and%20Third%20Party%20Advocacy%20Groups.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WM8W-LK77] (claiming that close ties between corporate donations and
positive opioid messaging enabled the U.S. opioids epidemic).
409. See SENATE U.S. HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFS. COMM., FUELING AN EPIDEMIC: INSYS
THERAPEUTICS AND THE SYSTEMIC MANIPULATION OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION 3–4 (2018),
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Again, the companion article illuminates these goals to greater depths,410 but
public health offers nothing less than a dazzling array of options beyond
modest monetary relief.
These goals are not pipe dreams; they are readily achievable. How? The
answer is holding actual trials. Unlike settlement, which is largely voluntary
for defendants (especially without a path to adjudication411), trials offer a
compulsory aspect, in which defendants are forced into court, and the
judgment may include more funds than defendants wish to pay or more
injunctive relief than they wish to bear. This is not surprising: serving
someone with a complaint begins a coercive process of adjudication.
However, resolving claims through settlement allows defendants to largely
set the terms of litigation relief. Trying, at minimum, a large fraction of cases
offers a public forum in which to scrutinize defendants’ conduct and judge
it based on the law of torts. Trial documents are public by default,412 and
there may be greater access to defendants’ funds through coercive
judgments, piercing the corporate veil, and punitive damages. Within this
nonvoluntary process is the prospect for true accountability.
Settlements do provide one other possible advantage: control over funds.
The prospect of disparate trials suggests that not every plaintiff will receive
compensation, and government plaintiffs who win monetary judgments may
see money enter government coffers without significant public-health
investment. A settlement could attempt to stipulate how to distribute money
among plaintiffs and how plaintiffs are to spend litigation returns.
However, as the 1990s tobacco settlement showed, controlling the use of
settlement funds is no easy task.413 States have spent a mere 3 percent of
tobacco settlement funds on tobacco control.414 Individual judges and juries,
in allocating judgment resources and fashioning specific relief, may do a
better job supporting public health. For example, an Oklahoma state court

https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/REPORT%20%20Fueling%20an%20Epidemic%20-%20Insys%20Therapeutics%20and%20the%20Systemic%
20Manipulation%20of%20Prior%20Authorization.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5NB-L6TT] (detailing
how the Insys Reimbursement Center misled and abused their power by incentivizing insurers and
PBMs to increase authorization rates).
410. Aaron, supra note 1.
411. See Erichson, supra note 325, at 1288–89 (“Disputants do not need adjudication to resolve
their disputes, but they need a path to adjudication if they are to achieve settlements that reflect the
merits of their claims and defenses.”).
412. See Oliva, supra note 91, at 670 (describing protective orders and the publication of trial
documents); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (providing the procedural rules for obtaining protective
orders).
413. See Berman, supra note 98, at 1058 (discussing the use of MSA funds as a “tragedy” for
failing to build a sustainable tobacco control infrastructure).
414. Id. at 1038 n.39 (citing Walter J. Jones & Gerard Silvestri, The Master Settlement
Agreement and Its Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years Later, 137 CHEST 692, 695 (2010)).
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judgment against Johnson & Johnson contained a comprehensive plan for
how the hundreds of millions of dollars were to be used, including various
treatment and prevention services.415 The court relied on the state
commissioner for the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services for the plan’s details.416 In addition, judges may enjoin an existing
public nuisance, as has occurred with environmental pollution.417 With help,
a group of trial judges may be better able to support public health than a oneshot settlement with little public-health oversight. Further, the prospect of
obtaining more funds through coercive process (as opposed to settlement) is
worth the investment.
In brief, rapid settlement offers an unmaximized amount of money on
defendants’ terms while giving short shrift to public-health goals. If we
believe that public health is an essential goal of litigation surrounding mass
death, then we should be troubled by agency problems that push toward an
unmaximized settlement.
2. Beyond the Opioid Litigation
Rapid settlement sends the message that, faced with one of the largest
public-health crises in American history, we will take a narrow view of
public health. The quick settlement approach selects a group of people in a
moment in time to receive relief—those who are currently suffering from
opioid addiction. This approach leaves behind many people who would
otherwise stand to benefit from the public-health impact of the litigation,
such as the unconceived baby who will be born into a historic and intractable
overdose crisis. Protecting the next generation is simply not the purpose of
rapid settlement. Although a focus on those with the most pressing needs
may feel righteous and proper, it ultimately reflects a narrow view of public
health. This paper has repeated the refrain that public health is broad across
people and time. It might be said, therefore, that attempts to obtain rapid
funding for a limited group of people are simply not oriented toward public
health.
Litigants’ implicit determination of the scope of public health carries
powerful expressive weight. No matter the outcome, litigants are likely to
tout it as a public-health victory. The populace may even buy this narrative.
Such an outcome would further the narrow conception that health is obtained

415. See State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 Okla. Dist. LEXIS
3486, at *44–62 (Okla. Dist. Aug. 26, 2019) (ordering court-imposed Abatement Plan for allocating
judgment funds toward achieving public-health objectives).
416. Id. at *44.
417. See Anthony Z. Roisman & Alexander Wolff, Trespass by Pollution: Remedy by
Mandatory Injunction, 21 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 157, 164–66 (2010) (explaining how public
nuisance and trespass law can be used to address pollution).
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through post-hoc medical treatment of disease, and public health is merely
the funding of medicine. Essentially, it would relegate public health to being
the glossy wrapping paper of medicine.
Public health, by nature, is capacious. It looks to address root causes and
prevent big social harms. Put another way, public health is far more than
healthcare, despite the fact they are often conflated. As two public-health
experts have argued, “The conflation of health and healthcare has resulted in
a one-sided, indefatigable investment in healthcare. Yet this focus on
curative medicine is not improving our health. We should be focusing on
health, on keeping us healthy to begin with.”418
A rapid settlement would help some people, no doubt, but too few scholars
and litigants have considered the bad that comes with the good. Rapid
settlement continues American overinvestment in healthcare to the exclusion
of preventive public-health mechanisms. It underutilizes the accountability
mechanisms within tort law that are capable of holding corporate defendants
to standards of conduct. It reinforces the idea that we can raise money for
people who are suffering without thinking about why they are sick to begin
with. Ultimately, rapid settlement recapitulates the status quo, but with slight
improvement. It is a failure of vision, it is shallow, and its expressive force
could sway other courts to accept similarly narrow public-health outcomes.
V. REFORMING PUBLIC-HEALTH LITIGATION
While much could be said about reforming public-health litigation, this
Section will attempt to draw lessons from the opioid litigation. Most
pressingly, modern MDLs have brought previously coercive and public
litigation into the domain of private agreements with little judicial or public
oversight.419 Further, MDLs are mandatory—plaintiffs cannot opt out.420 The
result is essentially that, with the exception of a few lucky bellwethers,
claims are held hostage until a confidential settlement can be reached,
without regard for public health.421 The simplest way to reclaim publichealth goals would be remanding a large fraction of cases. It is true these
cases would require federal judges’ time and resources—but MDLs can

418. Michael Stein & Sandro Galea, A Party Trick, PUB. HEALTH POST (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.publichealthpost.org/the-publics-health/a-party-trick [https://perma.cc/REQ7-8XF3].
419. See BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 167 (“When parties co-opt a public
system for their private bargaining needs, the whole structure shifts. . . . Getting rid of timeconsuming jury trials for all but a few bellwether cases means greater efficiency. But the costs are
steep too: fewer opportunities for public judgments, less transparency, fewer procedural safeguards,
and, quite possibly, less fairness.”).
420. Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation,
Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 111 (2015).
421. See supra Section IV.B. (discussing how rapid settlements in opioid litigation disserve
public health).
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streamline discovery and resolution of pretrial motions. Trials would help
produce larger monetary awards, more transparency, a better public venue to
discuss the misconduct at issue, specific relief, and, perhaps most
importantly, accountability.422
Congressional reforms could provide other destinations besides rapid
confidential settlement. MDL judges could be mandated to establish large
litigation tracks with tens or hundreds of trials. Alternatively, plaintiffs could
be guaranteed the opportunity to opt out and pursue trial. Early bellwether
settlement could be disincentivized by retaining a portion of the settlement
funds for the group. Congress could mandate that MDL documents,
including settlements, be made public, with a high bar to obtain a protective
order. Congress also could provide mechanisms to avoid sweetheart
settlements, such as having attorneys’ fees capped or paid by the state. Some
of these reforms are discussed in the companion piece,423 but suffice it to say
that Congress has broad authority to structure MDLs, and there is no shortage
of reforms that could better protect public health.424
To give public health a direct voice in the proceedings, MDLs could be
reformed to add public-health checks where public health is at issue. To this
end, public-health special masters could specifically represent public health
in mass tort litigation.425 Rule 53 allows appointment of a special master for
pretrial matters that cannot be effectively addressed by a federal judge, such
as a public-health evaluation.426 A public-health master should ideally not be
picked by the judge or the attorneys, who might favor individuals aligned
with rapid settlement. Rather, Congress should provide a process for the
selection of public-health masters, paid by government, to participate in
mass tort litigation. Although nobody can perfectly represent public health,
a complex and omnibus concept, these special masters would be a voice
specifically hired to support it. Congress could vest these public-health
masters with the authority to make public-health assessments of judicial
rulings or litigation outcomes. For example, where public health is

422. See Aaron, supra note 1.
423. Id.
424. For further discussion of possible MDL reforms for purposes beyond public health, see,
for example, Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(2021); BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19; David L. Noll, MDL as Public Administration,
118 MICH. L. REV. 403 (2019); Burch & Williams, supra note 393.
425. To the author’s knowledge, this has never been tried.
426. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(C) (defining scope of special masters’ authority to address
pretrial and posttrial matters); cf. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Special Masters
and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347, 347 (2008) (“[Rule 53] was undoubtedly intended to expand
the use of masters in new directions in order to assist courts in coping with ever-increasing
caseloads and in addressing difficult issues that require disproportionate judicial attention and
expertise not otherwise available to the court.”).
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implicated, Congress could require MDL settlements to be consistent with
public health as determined by a special master.427 Public-health special
masters would provide a more neutral assessment than an expert witness,
who tends to favor the position of the hiring counsel.428 In the absence of
legislation, courts could still appoint public-health special masters to
represent public health and bring necessary information to bear on important
decisions that implicate public health.
In addition, because many scholars believe MDLs have too many claims
to litigate individually,429 Congress could revitalize class actions, which are
increasingly obstructed by ongoing changes in civil procedure.430 Publichealth class actions, which carry the prospect of aggregate trial (unlike
MDLs), would generate more settlement pressure on defendants and more
leverage for plaintiffs. A resulting settlement would better reflect the
strength of plaintiffs’ cases and provide more money and accountability.
Congress could restore the class action by revising Rule 23. While many
reforms should be considered, an example is revising the commonality
requirement. Under modern Supreme Court precedent, plaintiffs often lack
the commonality with each other to establish a class action.431 However,
modern disease is often a function of nationwide misconduct surrounding
opioids, food, alcohol, tobacco, guns, and so forth. In public-health cases,
the peculiar harm to plaintiffs is less important than the broader practice that
often violates public-health laws and costs lives. Congress ought to design a
pathway for class actions predicated on patterns of conduct that harm public
health.432

427. This framework is similar to class-action requirements that settlements be fair, reasonable,
and adequate. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
428. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW
SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 32 (2008) (explaining how experts are
biased toward supporting parties who hire them).
429. See Gluck et al., supra note 19, at 359 (explaining the overflow of cases in MDLs and the
difficulty to avoid settlement because of these numbers).
430. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 15 (discussing increased procedural hurdles
to class-action certification); Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate
Litigation: A Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 296 (2014) (detailing procedural obstacles
created by courts to abide by Rule 23).
431. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 19, at 15. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
U.S. 338, 359–60 (2011) (discussing the lack-of-commonality rule for class actions); Miller, supra
note 430, at 321–22 (noting differences between plaintiffs that have led to failure of class
certification for lack of “cohesion”).
432. One possibility is using the issue class. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman,
Rediscovering the Issue Class in Mass Tort MDLs, 53 GA. L. REV. 1305, 1309 (2019) (arguing the
utility of issues classes in mass torts). However, congressional intervention might facilitate class
actions without the need for a change of heart in federal courts, and changes could be targeted to
protecting public health.
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CONCLUSION
The opioid crisis has led to a tremendous loss of life and generated family
traumas that will take decades to heal. As victims and governments have
turned to litigation, they have infused their disputes with the language and
significance of public health. The better one understands the opioid crisis,
the litigation, its players, and the historical and modern roles of tort law, the
clearer it becomes that the litigation is more than private. Article III stands
for the idea that courts resolve cases and controversies, but how they do so
in mass tort litigation implicates public health. Because of the tight
connection between the opioid litigation and public health, there arises the
prospect of agency problems.
Agency problems have led the parties in the opioid litigation to favor rapid
settlement to the exclusion of broader public-health goals. Of course, some
will argue that public health is represented in that rapid settlement will
provide money to alleviate the opioid epidemic. However, a broad
conception of public health would support different and larger goals that are
broad across people and time.433 Further, it appears that rapid resolution is
being advanced not for public-health reasons, but for efficiency, docket
clearance, and the financial incentives of attorneys. Given the constraints, it
is tempting to narrow the scope of public health to obtain some public-health
relief for the opioid crisis. However, this paper argues the scope of public
health must not be narrowed to accommodate serious agency problems.
If we aim to take seriously the root cause of the opioid crisis—largely
corporate misconduct—and if we desire to mitigate the underlying incentive
structures, we must retain a broad conception of public health across people
and time and target root causes and incentive structures. Companies must not
be allowed to buy their way out of misconduct with the financial returns of
a malfunctioning industry. To produce measurable change for today and for
future generations, we must recognize that the opioid litigation affects
everyone, and it is high time the participants give due consideration to what
would maximize public health.434

433. See Aaron, supra note 1 (discussing tort accountability within the opioid crisis).
434. See id. (elaborating on how the opioid litigation can maximize public health).

